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INTRODUCTION

Six years ago, a bankruptcy scholar's suggestion that Chapter 11, the
Bankruptcy Code's corporate reorganization chapter ,I should be abolished
would have interested almost no one except perhaps a few other
academicians. 2 Even then, at the height of the takeover boom, many

1.
Chapter 11 comprises §§ 1101-1174 of the Bankruptcy Code, Pub. L. No. 95598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended at 11 U .S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988)). Hereinafter,
Bankruptcy Code provisions will be cited as, "Bankruptcy Code § _ . "
2.
Douglas Baird made precisely this suggestion. See Douglas G. Baird, The
Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127 (1986) [hereinafter
Baird, Corporate Reorganizations]. This article and his work with Thomas Jackson
precipitated a much-cited debate between Baird and Elizabeth Warren, see Elizabeth
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observers predicted that Chapter 11 would be increasingiy important for
large , high profile corporations. But nearly everyone assumed, with a
few caveats, that Chapter 11 worked just fin e. What a difference a year
or two makes.
In the intervening time, lawyers , business people, and the general
public have witnessed a series of highly visible companies disintegrate in
bankruptcy. There have been successful reorganizations, of course, but
many see cases like the Eastern Airlines bankruptcy as more the order of
the day. Eastern had a somewhat shaky track record when it entered
Chapter 11, but had been a prominent air! ine for many years. Eastern
deteriorated rapidly and was eventually liquidated. 3 Another major
company, LTV Corporation, entered Chapter 11 several years before
Eastern and, after more than six years , still has not seen the light of
postbankruptcy day.
In a sense, then, Michael Bradley and Michael Rosenzweig simply
captured the spirit of the moment when they boldly proclaimed in an
article published in March 1992 that the time to eliminate Chapter 11 had
come. 4 Their broadside was particularly timely, coming during a period
of intense public anger at managers' lavish wages and lifestyles, because,
in addition to arguing that Chapter 11 does more harm than good, Bradley
and Rosenzweig conclude that managers are to blame. Even better, they
purport to back up this thesis with extensive empirical prooe

Warren , Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 775 (1987); Douglas G. Baird , Loss
Distribution, Forwn Shopping and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U . CHI. L. REv.
815 (1987), but did not create nearly so great a stir in the popular media and the
bankruptcy bar as the Bradley and Ro senzweig article discu ssed below.
3.
See, e. g., Claudia MacLachlan , Blame Flies in Demise ofAirline, NAT'L L.J.,
May 27 , 1991, at 1, 35-36.
4.
Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzwe ig, Tlze Unten able Case f or Chapter 11,
101 YALE L.J. 1043 (1992).
5.
As both Lynn LoPucki and Elizabeth Wa rren po int out in new commentaries
on the Bradley and Rosenzwe ig artic le, the empirical analysis proves problematic on
inspection. Lynn M. LoPucki, Strang e Visions in a Strange World: A Reply to Professors
Bradley and Rosenzweig, 91 MICH . L. REV. 79 (1992) ; Elizabeth Warren, Th e Untenable
Casefor Repeal of Chapter 11, 102 YALE L.J. 437 (1992) . Bradley and Rosenzweig
compare the pre and postbankruptcy stock and bond vaiues of publicly held firms that
filed under the fo rmer Bankruptcy Act , to those that have ftl ed under the 1978 Bankruptcy
Code. They conclude from their data that firm s filin g Chapter 11 petitions under the
Bankruptcy Code were wo rth signifi cantly more on the ftling date, but lost a much higher
percentage of their value while in bankruptcy. Bradley & Ro senzweig , supra note 4, at
1076-77. However, Bradley and Rosenzweig fail to consid er th e substantial differences
between Act and Code debto rs . Mo reover, courts may well have permitted greater
deviations from the absolute prio rity rule in cases under the old Act. LoPucki, supra, at
94 . Warren questions the accuracy of their data set and suggests seve ral alternative
explanations for their res ults. Warren , supra, at 455-67.
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If the current reorganization regime does not work, the obvious
question that arises is, what should done? Bradley and Rosenzweig would
replace Chapter 11 with a "contingent equity" regime providing for the
automatic cancellation of a corporation's stock in the event of any default.
At least four other commentators have offered their own alternatives to
Chapter 11, ranging from Barry Adler's modified version of the Bradley
and Rosenzweig proposal, 6 to Doug Baird's consideration of the efficacy
of mandatory auctions/ and James Bowers's suggestion that we should
jettison Chapter 11 altogether and simply leave the parties to their own
devices. 8 The one thing the proposals have in common is their insistence
on the need for a much more market-oriented regime.
A central purpose of this Article is to bring the various proposals
together and to scrutinize each in some detail. I begin this process in Part
I with a brief overview of the proposals and the theoretical background
from which they have emerged.
Having introduced the proposed
alternatives to Chapter 11 in Part I, I examine each in turn in Part II.
The discussion reveals that each of the proposals has significant flaws and
suggests that none is clearly superior to Chapter 11 for all kinds of
debtors.
In Part III, I shift gears and address the more practical question of
whether any of the proposals, or perhaps a different proposal, is likely to
be adopted by Congress. The standard public choice story suggests that
managers and members of the corporate and bankruptcy bars are
sufficiently well organized and have so much at stake, that they will
thwart any attempted reform of Chapter 11. The problem with this story
is that it not only ignores the influence of interest groups such as
institutional investors, but it also fails to consider the importance of
widespread populist antipathy toward both managers and the corporate
and bankruptcy bars. Although my public choice analysis suggests that
reform is at least possible once these crucial factors are taken into
account, I use a modified version of Karl Polanyi's thesis in The Great
Transfonnation 9 to argue that none of the current proposals is I ike! y ever
to make it through Congress. Polanyi posited that the state will inevitably
act to prevent the market from becoming self-regulating. With the limited
exception of mandatory auctions, all of the proposals aspire to selfregulation; in the search for a pure market solution to the problems of
Chapter 11, each under appreciates the importance of the courts in the

6.
7.
8.

See infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
See infra note 28 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.

9.

KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (1944).
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insolvency context 10 and, as a result, would almost certainly prove
unattractive to Congress.
The first three parts of the Article are largely destructive, raising
questions about each of the new proposals and then casting doubt on the
suggestion that any might one day be adopted. I change tacks a final time
in Part IV. In that part, I argue that while the proposals themselves
should not be adopted, they do suggest ways in which the current
bankruptcy laws should be radically amended. I contend in particular that
the drafters should split Chapter 11 into two chapters, one dealing with
close and the other with nonclosely held corporations. My proposal is,
in a sense, a call to return to the format of the old Bankruptcy Act, and
an endorsement of at least one aspect of an early version of the
bankruptcy legislation that nearly passed Congress in 1992. Both
contemplated separate treatment of different kinds of corporations.
Unfortunately, both were deeply flawed. I conclude by showing the
problems of each, and why my two corporation system would improve on
both.

I. BANKRUPTCY THEORY AND THE EMERGING NEW ORDER
The proposed alternatives to Chapter 11 can and perhaps should be
seen as the second generation of the path-breaking work on bankruptcy
theory done by Douglas Baird and Thomas Jackson in the 1980s. I
therefore begin by describing Baird and Jackson's creditors' bargain
model of bankruptcy, and the critiques that eventually led to the new
proposals. This paves the way for a short synopsis of each of the
proposals at the end of this part.

A. The Creditors' Bargain Model
Bankruptcy dramatically changes relationships among a debtor and
its creditors. In the absence of bankruptcy, an individual creditor's rights

against the debtor are governed by contract, together with (mostly) state
debt collection laws . Bankruptcy calls a halt to these individual

10.
I refer to the "insolvency regime ~ or the " insolvency context~ throughout
the Article and often use these terms as synonyms for Chapter 11 , bankruptcy, or one of
the proposed alternatives to Chapter 11 . Strictly speaking, the term is not accurate, since
solvent fl1Tl1s are not precluded from filing a Chapter 11 petition. Neverthe less, the term
is convenient, and most fl1Tl1s that file for bankruptcy are in fact insolvent. See, e.g.,
Lynn M . LoPucki & William C. Whitfo rd , Bargaining over Equity's Share in the
BanJ:ruptcyReorga nizationofLarge, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 125,
141-43 (1990) [hereinafter , LoPucki & Whitford, Bargaining over Equity's Sh are].
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The creditors' bargain model quickly assumed an almost caiionical
status and, in consequence, became the subject of immediate and sustained
critical attention. Much of the initial questioning of the model stemmed
from the observation that, as a descriptive matter, bankruptcy deviates
markedly from the creditors' bargain ideal. Rather than preserving the
parties' state law entitlements (other than a creditor's right of immediate
collection), bankruptcy only incompletely honors the priorities of higher
priority creditors, appearing instead to favor lower priority creditors and
the debtor. 18 Some commentators have suggested that, if this risk
sharing is viewed as a form of insurance, it arguably can be reconciled
with the creditors' bargain model. 19
By contrast, commentators
unsympathetic to the contractarian nature of the Baird and Jackson
analysis view bankruptcy's alteration of the parties' prebankruptcy
priorities as evidence that the creditors' bargain approach is misguided.
In their view, bankruptcy should, and does, implement important societal
values not reflected in the creditors' bargain framework. 20
The most recent contractarian scholarship takes a different tack and
calls into question Baird and Jackson's central assumption that bankruptcy
is necessary to solve a common pool or prisoners' dilemma problem.

18.
While the absolute priority rule theoretically protects secured creditors'
priorities, confmnation of a consensual reorganization plan is only possible if every class
of claims and interests approves the plan. Bankruptcy Code § 1129(a)(8). Ensuring
universal approval frequently requires that higher priority creditors agree to accept less
than full payment. See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., The Nature and Effect of Corporate
Voting in Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases, 78 VA. L. REV. 461,484 (1992). Moreover,
a secured creditor is not entitled to receive postpetition interest unless it is oversecured.
!d.; Bankruptcy Code § 506(b).
19.
Robert E. Scott, Through Bankruptcy with the Creditors' Bargain Heuristic,
53 U. CHI. L. REv . 690 (1986) (proposing a "common disaster" explanation of
bankruptcy); Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An
Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors' Bargain, 75 VA. L. REV . 155 (1989).
Jackson and Scott argue that if many debtors (and perhaps low priority creditors) are risk
averse, debtors may be willing to pay marginally higher interest rates in return for the
assurance that secured creditors will contribute to any reorganization effort. As with the
original version of the creditors' bargain heuristic, bankruptcy can be seen as
implementing an arrangement-here, risk sharing-that the parties themselves would have
agreed to in the absence of insurmountable coordination costs. Id. at 167-69. As Jackson
and Scott acknowledge, however, the risk sharing that occurs under the current
Bankruptcy Code seems poorly tailored to any such insurance goal. I d. at 200-01; Robert
K. Rasmussen, The Efficiency ofChapter 11, 8 BANKR. DEY. J. 319, 329-31 (1991).
Moreover, the prospect of risk sharing may distort managers' incentives prior to
bankruptcy. Barry E . Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 77 CORNELL L. REV . 439,
473 (1992) [hereinafter Adler, Risk Allocation] .
20.
Warren, supra note 2; Donald R. Korobkin, Value and Rationaiity in
Bankruptcy Decisionmaking , 33 WM . & MARY L. REV. 333 (1992); Donald R. Korobkin,
Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisp rudence of Bankruptcy, 91 COUJ}.f. L. REV. 717 (1991).
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remedies 11 and imposes a collectivized debt collection regime in their
stead . In bankruptcy, creditors must act (and are dealt with by the
debtor) primarily in classes rather than as individuals. 12
In the early 1980s, Thomas Jackson offered the first systematic
attempt to normatively justify bankruptcy's alteration of the individual
contracts entered into by a debtor and its creditors. 13 Jackson and his
frequent co-author, Douglas Baird, base their conception, the creditors'
bargain model, on what they describe as a "hypothetical bargain" among
creditors. 14 Were creditors able to bargain among themselves ex ante,
Baird and Jackson argue, they would agree to restrain from exercising
their individual collection rights in the event the debtor encountered
financial difficulties. Otherwise, a costly "race to the courthouse" would
develop, with each creditor rushing to enforce its collection rights at the
first sign of trouble, lest other creditors get there first and levy on all of
the debtor's available assets. In their zeal to ensure satisfaction of their
particular debts, the creditors might dismember a debtor that, on
reflection, all would agree is worth more to the creditors collectively as
a going concern. 15
Baird and Jackson argue that creditors are too widely dispersed to
bargain effectively among themselves; bankruptcy is therefore necessary
to implement the bargain to which the parties would have agreed had
negotiation been possible: in particular, to require that creditors restrain
from prebankruptcy races to the courthouse. 16 But bankruptcy should
not alter the parties' state law entitlements in any other way. Both to
prevent forum shopping and to give secured creditors sufficient incentives
to participate, the substantive rules in place in bankruptcy should mirror
those operative outside of bankruptcy. 17

11.
Bankruptcy Code§ 362 imposes an automatic stay on most efforts to co llect
on a debt owed by the debtor.
12.
See, e.g., Bankruptcy Code§ 1123 (requiring proponent of a reorganization
plan to designate classes of claims and interests).
See Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements and the
13.
Creditors' Bargain, 91 YALE L.J . 857 (1982).
14.
See, e.g. , THOMAS H . JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY
LAW (1986); Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and
the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protecrion of
Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 97 (1984) .
15.
Jackson, supra note 13, at 862.
16.
Baird and Jackson describe creditors' predicament in te rms of the familiar
prisoners' dilemma and common pool puzzles developed by economists. The problem in
each case is that even rational individuals may make collectively suboptimal dec isions if
they are unable to coo rdinate their choices. !d.
17.
!d. at 867-70.
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One branch of this criticism argues that the common pool characterization
fo cuses only on creditors, whereas in reality the debtor plays a crucial
role in the process. 2 1 Another suggests that even if there were a risk
that creditors would dismember a viable debtor, the parties themselves
could prevent this result tiuough the skillful use of secured credit
arrangements. 22 Much more than their predecessors, these critiques go
to the very heart of the creditors' bargain model justification of
bankruptcy.

B. Ihe New Proposals to Replace Chapter 11
As discussed earlier, Michael Bradley and Michael Rosenzweig drew
national attention early last year when they argued that Chapter 11 should
be abolished. On a theoretical level, the recent commentary discussed
above-in particular, the doubts it casts on the most important normative
justification for bankruptcy-under! ies their and other recent calls for an
end to Chapter 11. But this in itself cannot explain the sudden public
interest, and debate, as to the future of the current bankruptcy regime. 23
The intensity of the controversy stems from an increasingly widespread
perception not only that Chapter 11 is unnecessary , but that it also may
have affirmatively harmful consequences for many firms.
Two central concerns help explain why Chapter 11 is suddenly more
out of fashion than Nero. The first, and most obvious, issue is the
tremendous costs of Chapter 11. The attorneys' and accountants' fees
alone can be substantial in a lengthy case, and Chapter 11 creates
significant indirect costs, such as disruption and lost opportunities, as
well. 24 It does not take too many Chapter 11s like the Eastern Airlines

21 .
James W . Bowers, Groping and Coping in the Shadow of Murphy's Law:
Bankruptcy Theory and the Elementary Economics of Failure , 88 MICH . L. REV . 2097,
2111-13(1990) [hereina fterBowers , Murphy'sLaw] . See alsoJ amesW . Bowers , Whither
What Hits the Fan?: Murphy's Law, Bankruptcy Th eory, and the Elementary Economics
of Loss Distribution , 26 GA. L. REv. 27 (1991) [hereina fter Bowers, Loss Distribution] .
22 .
Randal C . Picker, Security Interests, Misbehavior and Common Pools , 59 U.
CHJ . L. REv . 645 (1 992).
For examples o f recent articles about the Bradley & Rosenzweig proposal, see
23 .
Emily Barker, Pair Puts Spotlight on Chapter 11 's Flaws , AM . LAW . , May 1992, at 119;
Peter Passell , Economic Scene: Fun, Games, Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES , Apr. 29 , 1992,
at D2 ; Allen R. Myerso n, Rethinking the Law that Gives Golden Eggs After the Goose is
Dead , N.Y . TIMES , Apr. 5, 1992 , at E2 ; Michelle Singletary, Panel Vot es to Fonn
Bankruptcy Study Body , WASH. POST, Ma r. 20 , 1992 , at F1; Wade Lambe rt & Milo
Geyelin, Bankruptcy Lawyers Dispute Call for Scrapping Chapter 11 Process , WALL ST.
J., Mar. 19 , 1992 , at B5.
24 .
Estimates of th e direct costs o f bankruptcy ran ge to as high a s 25 % of a
debto r' s asset val ue, s ee DAVID T. STANLEY & MARJ ORIE GIRTH , BANKR UPTCY:
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fiasco to raise widespread questions as to whether these costs generate
sufficient offsetting benefits. Second, Chapter 11 may also have negative
effects even before a firm files for bankruptcy relief. Commentators have
focused in particular on managers' incentives. Because it limits the
downside of any business disaster, they reason, Chapter 11 encourages
managers to issue excessive debt and otherwise take excessive risks. 25
What should be done if we conclude that Chapter 11 has failed of its
essential purposes? Almost all of the recent literature argues for the
adoption of one or more of four general alternatives in place of the
current regime: 1) auctions; 2) implementation of a predetermined
bankruptcy capital structure; 3) automatic cancellation of shareholders'
interests; and 4) elimination of bankruptcy altogether. I devote the
remainder of this part to a brief discussion of the various proposals and
of the advantages they appear to offer over Chapter 11.
1.

THE BANKRUPTCY AUCTION

In its current form, Chapter 11 combines the decisions as to how a
firm's assets should be deployed-i.e., should the firm be liquidated or
reorganized, and if reorganized, in what form-with those concerning the
parties' claims and their priorities vis-a-vis one another.
This
intertwining of the asset deployment and claimant entitlement issues
creates two significant and related costs. First, parties' views about
entitlement may color their perceptions concerning asset deployment. For
instance, unsecured creditors may support an inferior reorganization plan
if it offers them a larger piece of the overall pie. 26 Second, inability to

PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM 263 (1971), but other commentators provide substantially
lower estimates. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and
Violation of Priority of Claims, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 285 (1990) (average of 3%). For
discussions of the indirect costs of bankruptcy, see Adler, Risk Allocation, supra note 19,
at 465-66; Robert H. Mnookin & Robert B. Wilson, Rational Bargaining and Market
Efficiency: Understanding Pennzoil v. Texaco, 75 VA. L. REv. 295, 313 (1989).
25.
Adler, Risk Allocation, supra note 19, at 473-74; Bradley & Rosenzweig,
supra note 4, at 1047. Bradley and Rosenzweig attribute far greater evils to the managers
of bankrupt firms, suggesting not only that their decision-making incentives are
problematic, but that managers afflllTiatively divert assets away from the other
constituencies of the flllTI. ld. at 1052, 1075. The problem with this assertion is that
Bradley and Rosenzweig offer absolutely no evidence of how managers are able to
perpetrate such a heist, and the observations of other scholars and practitioners contradict
their management looting thesis. See, e.g., LoPucki, supra note 5, at 94-97. The
frequency with which managers are displaced in Chapter 11 makes the thesis particularly
suspect. !d. at 95 (high managementtumover); Stuart C. Gilson, Bankruptcy, Boards and
Blockholders, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 355 (1990) (same).
26.
I discuss this problem in somewhat more detail in an earlier article. Skeel,
supra note 18, at 502-03. See also Baird & Jackson, supra note 14, at 108.
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resolve asset deployment issues until heterogeneous groups of claimants
thrash out their entitlement disputes is costly and can all but paralyze a
firm for the duration of a Chapter 11 case. Many observers point to this
second concern, the need for negotiation among heterogeneous creditors,
as Chapter 11 's single greatest flaw. 27
Douglas Baird was perhaps the first to suggest that Chapter 11 might
profitably be jettisoned in favor of an auction, at least if the debtor is a
large, publicly held firm. 28 The chief virtue of a mandatory bankruptcy
auction is that it would separate the deployment and entitlement decisions.
Under such a regime, a court or a trustee would sell the bankrupt firm to
the highest bidder, thus ideally moving the assets to their most valued use
quickly and inexpensively. This would enable the court to determine
priority and other issues separately, and simply give the claimants their
share of an extant pot of cash. Replacing the hypothetical sale of Chapter
11 with an actual sale might therefore both improve the quality of the
asset deployment decision and decrease the deadweight costs of
bankruptcy.

2.

IMPLEMENTATION OF A PREPLANNED CAPITAL STRUCTURE

Both Alan Schwartz and Robert Rasmussen have recently suggested
that firms should be permitted to opt out of bankruptcy if they so
choose. 29 If Chapter 11 were optional, rather than being a firm's only
choice of insolvency regime, debtors might devise their own alternatives
to bankruptcy; firms might, for instance, provide for a special
"bankruptcy capital structure" in their debt contracts or their charter,

27.
See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Bankruprcy and Debr: A New Model for Corporale
Reorganizarion, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 527, 538-40 (1983) [hereinafter Roe, A New Mode[];
Philippe Aghion, Oliver Hart, & John Moore, The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform, at
8-9 (1992) (unpublished manuscript). One way to address this problem is to narrow the
range of potential bargaining, so as to minimize the likelihood of strategic behavior by the
parties. Several of the rules I propose in Part IV would have precisely this effect.
28.
Baird, Corporare Reorganizarion.s, supra note 2, at 139-41; Adler, Risk
Allocation, supra note 19, at 488. Mark Roe had previously proposed a partial auction
approach, suggesting that courts might sell a portion of the stock of a Chapter 11 debtor
to the market as a means of determining the value of the finn, Roe, A New Model, supra
note 27. Several years after the Roe and Baird articies, Lucian Bebchuk offered an
options-based approach to the reorganization process. Lucian A. Bebchuk, A New
Approach to Corporare Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L. REv. 775 , 785-88 (1988). 1
discuss the Bebchuk proposal (as incorporated into another recent auction proposal) at
greater length infra Section II.A.2.
29.
Alan Schwartz, Bankruptcy Workouts and Debt Conrracts, 36 J.L. & ECON.
(forthcoming 1993); Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice: A Menu Approach to
Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 TEX. L. REv. 51 (1992).
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consisting of preplanned adjustments that would be triggered by financial
distress. 30 Rasmussen suggests that even firms opting for Chapter 11 in
its current form could take advantage of this flexibility. A firm wishing
to make use of the new value exception to the absolute priority rule, for
instance, could specify in advance how much equity holders must
contribute and what portion of the finn's stock they would receive in
return. 31
Use of a predetermined capital structure would ideally simplify both
the asset deployment and the claimant entitlement decisions, since the
parties would make these decisions in advance, at a time when their
interests are more likely to be congruent. The strategy also seems largely
to obviate the need for judicial involvement in the insolvency process.

3.

AUTOMATIC CANCELLATION OF SHAREHOLDERS' INTERESTS:
THE CONTINGENT/CHAMELEON EQUITY PROPOSAL

The Bradley and Rosenzweig proposal, which has been modified and
refined by Barry Adler as a "chameleon equity" approach 32 (I will refer
to the proposals together as "contingent/chameleon equity"), boasts
similar virtues. These commentators argue for automatic cancellation of
shareholders' interests in the event of a default. Upon cancellation of
shareholders' interests, the next highest class of claimants would replace
them as the firm's shareholders. 33
Bradley and Rosenzweig envision that a firm in danger of defaulting
on its obligations will raise money by issuing equity. Only when the
firm's liabilities exceed its assets, and its stock has therefore become
worthless, will the firm be unable to sell equity. The firm's subsequent
default will reflect true insolvency, thus justifying the elimination of its
current stockholders' interests. 34

30.
Neither Schwartz nor Rasmussen suggests that firms should be required to
devise a finn-specific insolvency capital structure.
Rather, Schwartz attempts to
demonstrate that firms could plausibly replicate the virtues of bankruptcy through contract;
Rasmussen argues for a menu o f po ss ible insolvency regimes which would give firms, as
one of their options, the right to develop their own tailor-made insolvency regime.
31.
Rasmussen , supra note 29, at 110-11.
32.
Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate
Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 311 (1993) [hereinafter Adler, Financial and Political
Theories] . Adler 's article, which was written contemporaneously with Bradley and
Rosenzweig's , cures many of the more prominent defects of the co ntingent equity
proposal. See, e.g., infra note 87 .
33 .
Adler, Financial and Political Theories, supra note 32 ; Bradley &
Rosenzwe ig , supra note 4, at 1078-86.
34.
Brad ley & Rosenzweig, s upra note 4, at 1081-82.
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One potential benefit of automatic cancell ation is its effect on
managers' incentives. Because managers cannot look forward to the '"soft
landing" provided by Chapter 11 in its current form, they will be less
Like the
inclined to gamble excessively with the firm's assets.
implementation of a predetermined capital structure alternative discussed
above, automatic cancellation also dramatically simplifies the asset
deployment and claimant entitlement questions by resolving them in
advance, and all but eliminates the role of the court.
4.

ELIMINATION OF CHAPTER

11

ALTOGETHER

Some commentators have at least tentatively suggested that Chapter
11 should be eliminated altogether and that creditors and their debtors

should simply be left to the state law collection regime. 35 James Bowers
frames such a suggestion as a critique of the common pool metaphor
underlying Baird and Jackson's creditors' bargain mode\. 36 As discussed
earlier, Bowers argues that this metaphor ignores the role of the debtor
as the most efficient liquidator of its estate. In his view, bankruptcy's
"equal treatment of similarly situated creditors" norm, and its prohibition
of preferences, may interfere with debtors' efforts efficiently to
distinguish among their creditors in responding to financial crises. 37
Thus, abolishing Chapter 11 not only would save the direct and indirect
costs of a bankruptcy proceeding, it might also facilitate more efficient
adjustments by debtors in the event L.1at disaster strikes.

II.

WHAT A WoNDERFUL WoRLD IT WoULD BE?

In this part, I take a closer and more critical look at each of the
proposals described in Part I. My aim throughout is to present a fuller
picture of the consequences the proposals would have and imp! icitly to
ask, with respect to each, whether it offers an improvement over current
Chapter 11. In subsequent parts, I will consider whether Congress is

35.
Bowers, Murphy's Law, supra note 21; Bowers, Loss Distribution, supra note
21. Bowers's approach differs from Robe rt Ras mussen's "menu approach" to bankruptcy,
Rasmussen, supra note 29, in that whereas Bowers appears at times to assume that debtors
would forgo bankruptcy altogether were it abolished, Rasmussen suggests that finns would
devise their own alternatives. To facilitate this process, Rasmussen argues that Congress
should give the parties several preformulated options, including the current Chapte r 7 and
Chapter 11 regimes, as well as permitting them to create their own alternative.
Bowers, Murphy's Law, supra note 21, at 2 108-13.
36 .
37.
Jd.; Bowers, Loss Distribution, supra note 2 1, at 33-35.
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likely to adopt any of the proposals, and I will suggest an alternati ve
blueprint for change.

A. Chinks in the Case for Mandatory Auctions
1. A WORLD THAT ONLY ALLOWED AUCTIONS

Mandatory auctions intuitively seem to offer tremendous savings in
comparison with the cost of a protracted Chapter 11 case. An auction can
move the assets of a financially troubled firm to the highest valuing user
much more quickly, and can prevent asset deployment decisions from
bogging down in the parties' negotiations over their respective
entitlements . But on closer inspection the promise of mandatory auctions
is far Iess clear.
The chief problem with the mandatory auction proposal-one which
largely renders moot the question whether auctions would be any less
costly than Chapter I P8-is that it simply would not work as intended
in the insolvency context. First, auctions are likely to be plagued by an
absence of potential bidders. At least with respect to publicly held
debtors, few bidders could raise financing sufficiently quickly to
participate actively in an auction market. 39 While the existence of an
auction market might itself generate increased interest in the financial
community, the likelihood of a truly competitive market seems remote.
This dilemma is exacerbated by the fact that the most likely bidders for
a corporation frequently are firms in the same industry. If the problems
that led to the debtor's demise were industry-wide, few or none of these
firms would be able to bid. 40 Even more than with the corporate

38.
The direct costs of an auction regime would include not only the costs (such
as advertising, hiring an investment banker, and providing informatio n to potential
bidders) of conducting the auction, but also the cost of resolving the parties' respective
entitlements , since auctions would not eliminate this aspect of bankruptcy. See, e.g.,
DOUGLAS G. BAIRD , REVISITING AUCTIONS IN CHAPTER 11 (Chicago Law and Economics
Working Paper No. 7 (2d Series) 1992). Similarly, whil~ auctions appear to minimize
the indirect costs of bankruptcy, they might simply shift these costs forwa rd in time .
Whereas fmns' attention currently is diverted, and opportunities are lost, during
bankruptcy, the prospect of an auction might cause managers to devote all of their energy
to forestalling bankruptcy in the event of fmancial difficulties , thus distracting the firm
prior to bankruptcy. Jd. In short, a comparison of the costs o f auctions, to those of the
current regime , proves inconclusive at best.
39.
Roe, supra note 27, at 573; Aghion et al. , supra note 27, at 8.
40.
See Andrei Shliefer & Robert W. Vishny , Liquidation Values and Debt
Capacity: A Marker Equilibriwn Approach, 47 J. FIN . 1343 (1992).
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takeover market, a very small number of players would dominate the
auction process in bankruptcy. 41
Second, even in an otherwise competitive market, the potentially
enormous costs of gathering and analyzing information, of choosing an
appropriate capital structure for the firm, and of the bidding process itself
would deter many bidders. Each bidder knows that these costs will be
lost for all except the winning bidder and that, if the auction is hotly
contested, every bidder may end up with losses. As a result, many
bidders will decide (perhaps after a brief exploratory effort) not to make
a serious effort to investigate the firm and to enter the bidding process. 42
The chilling effect of bidding costs further calls into question the
Iike! ihood of an effective auction process. 43
Robert Gertner and Randal Picker have recently pointed out an
additional problem with mandatory auctions in bankruptcy. The financial

41.
See, e.g., Edward B. Rock, Antitrust and the Market for Corporate Control,
77 CALIF . L. REv. 1365 , 1379 (1989) (market for corporate control is more similar to
market for art than to a thick competitive market due the relative dearth of prospective
buyers for any given company at a particular time). A recent empirical study by LoPucki
and Whitford reinforces the concern as to the number of likely bidders. LoPucki and
Whitford found that, in the auctions currently taking place in Chapter 11, there frequently
is only one bidder. See Lynn M . LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate
Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141
U. PA . L. REV. 669, 764-65 (1993).
42.
See, e.g., Aghion eta!., supra note 27, at 10. The dilemma outlined in the
text is somewhat analogous to the "first mover" problem. The first mover problem stems
from bidders' perception that, once one bidder has incurred the costs of investigating a
firm and preparing a bid, that bidder will bid up to the full value of the fmn in the event
of a competitive auction . Subsequent bidders may thus face a "lose-lose" situation : If
they bid the value of the fmn or less, they will lose the bidding; and if they bid enough
to win, they will have overpaid. As a result, subsequent bidders will refrain from
bidding, and the first bidder will win with a low bid. See, e.g. , Adler, Financial and
Political Theories , supra note 32, at 321. There is reason to doubt that the first bidder
will get a completely accurate picture of the firm's value even after investigation
(especially if management is uncooperative); moreover, the first move r problem is likely
to arise only in the "com mon values" context, that is, where the assets have the same
value for all potential bidders. Furthe r, the problem could be minimized in bankruptcy
by giving multiple bidders equal access to the fmn, and requiring that bids be submitted
simultaneously. Neve rtheless, the ultimate effect in bankruptcy is likely to be the same:
Few bidders will come forward in any given auction.
43 .
Note that, even if bidders ignored the risks discussed in the text, and did in
fact bid competitively, an auction reg ime still would be problematic. Rather than paying
too little for a debtor corporation, the winning bidder might frequently pay too much .
See, e.g., BernardS. Black, Bidder Overpaymenr in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REv. 597
(1989) (discussing the "winner's curse" problem in the takeover context); ERIC
RAsMUSSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION : AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 252
(1989). This might forc e winners to canniba lize the company, and would significantly
increa se the li..l.::elihood of a subsequent return to bankruptcy.
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statements of a firm experiencing financial distress give a mi sleading
picture of the firm, due to the fact that managers frequently take unusual
actions in an effort to forestall barlkruptcy-managers will have preferred
some creditors and left others unpaid, for instance, and otl-)erwise juggled
their cash flow .44 In contrast to bankruptcy, which creates a "breathing
space" during which creditors and third parties can observe the debtor
under somewhat more normal conditions, a mandatory auction would
require bidders to make their bids almost immediately. The atypical
nature of the firm's activities in the period before the auction would
further distort the bidding process; it might also force the winning bidder
to postpone or forego potential opportunities until she has time to observe
the firm in operation.
Because small and medium-sized firms tend to be local or regional
in scope, do not regularly supply financial information to the markets, and
are most effective if their owners also manage the firm, the limitations of
an auction regime would be exacerbated in this context. Moreover,
bidders' realizations that the success of a close corporation usually
depends upon the continued involvement of its current managers, and that
the managers would refuse to stay on board unless they retained their
ownership interest, would significantly dampen their incentive to bid. In
short, mandatory auctions are problematic even for publicly held
corporations and seem wholly implausible as an alternative to Chapter 11
for smaller corporations.

2.

AGHION, HART, AND MOORE: THE OPTIONS ALTERNATIVE

Aghion, Hart, and Moore have recently proposed a modified version
of the mandatory auction proposal, one which uses an options scheme
originally proposed by Lucian Bebchuk, in an effort to remedy several
defects of a pure auction regime. 45 In an options regime, the bankruptcy
judge or other official would begin by determining the amounts and
respective priorities of all of the claims and interests in the financially
troubled firm. The court would distribute all of the firm's stock (subject
to redemption) to its senior creditors in lieu of their claims, and members
of each lower class would be given options to purchase a pro rata share
of the stock temporarily held by senior creditors. A second priority
creditor could exercise her option to purchase stock by paying her pro
rata portion of the senior debt; a third priority creditor could do so by
paying her pro rata portion of the senior debt plus her pro rata share of

44.
Robert Gertner & Randal C . Picker, Bankruptcy and the Allocation of Control
(1992) (un published manu script).
45 .
Aghion et al. , sup ra note 27.
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the second priority debt; and so on. 46 The proposal contemplates that
lower priority creditors and shareholders would exercise tl)eir options
only if they felt the firm was worth more L1an the sum of all superio r
claims. Thus , L1e process would ideally put stock in the hands of the true
residual claimants of the finn , and provide for payment in full of the
firm's higher priority creditors.
In addition to overseeing the options process, the judge
simultaneousl y would take bids for the firm. Both insiders, such as the
finn's managers, and third parties could bid, and bids need not be in cash
or contemplate payment to the new shareholders to qualify .47 Thus, the
current managers could offer to continue running the company and
propose that the new shareholders simply retain their stock, just as a third
party could offer to buy the firm from its shareholders in cash. Once the
bids were in, the shareholders would vote for whichever proposal they
found most attractive. In th.e view of Aghion, Hart, and Moore, the
entire process could be completed in three or four months. 48
The principal advantage of the options alternative lies in its opening
up of the bidding process. By allowing both cash and noncash bids, the
options approach reduces the likelihood that only one bidder will bid,
since entry would not be limited to bidders capable of financing an
outright sale. It also reintroduces the possibility that the firm could
reorganize under current management without the intervention of a sale,
thus retaining the chief benefit of Chapter 11, yet without sacrificing the
disciplining effect that the prospect of an auction has on managers'
behavior prior to bankruptcy: Only if management could persuade the
new shareholders to support such a plan, in preference to all of the other
bids, would it win out.
The most obvious problem with the options approach, as with the
Bebchuk proposal upon which it is based, is that the distribution and
exercise of options that the scheme envisions would only work effectively
in a perfectly efficient market. 49 Even if claimants could accurately
predict the value of the firm (an extremely problematic assumption,

46.
!d. at 16-18; Bebchuk, supra note 28.
Aghio n et al., supra note 27, at 14-15.
47.
48 .
!d. at 14, 17-18 .
49 .
Aghion, Hart, and Moore anticipate this prob lem with their proposal, and
suggest four alternative mean s of allocating equity . Unfortunately, the alternatives are,
if anything , more problematic than the option scheme. !d. at 24-25. Two of the
alternatives-allocating equity in proportion to the face value of the claims against a finn,
and simply allocating all equity to secured creditors-are arbitrary and would c reate huge
strategic behavior problems. The third and fou rth, basing the allocation on the highes t
cash bid received or on the valuation of an outside investment bank , a re only marginally
more l.ik:ely to yield an appropriate all ocation .
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particularly m u'1e insolvency context) and, based on their prediction,
make into nned decisions as to whether to exercise, the proposal forces
L.'1em to contribute new cash to the firm if ti-}ey wish to receive stock.
Many claimants may have difficulty raising t..l-Je necessary cash; 50 one
suspects, especially in the small firm context, that these claimants would
simply let their options lapse if they have aJlY doubts about the value of
their claim. 51
Moreover, a court could not begin distributing stock options to the
parties until after it had resolved the parties' entitlement disputes; nor
could it open the bidding process prior to this point (despite the proposal's
suggestion to the contrary), since shareholder and creditor bidders could
not bid until they knew their status within the firm. Untangling the
parties' entitlements would significantly delay the auction, often to a date
well beyond the four monbis the proposal predicts for the entire process.
Finally, although the options approach does expand the bidding
process, its auctions still would suffer from a serious lack of outside
bidders, since industry-wide financial difficulties would create the same
problems in this context as they would for the traditional auction
approach. In addition, other potential bidders might decline to participate
for fear that, because the firm's managers also are likely to be bidders,
the managers may and probably would stonewall outsiders who sought to
acquire detailed information about the firm.
In short, the options approach offers a valuable twist on the
mandatory auction regime, but it is far from a perfect solution to the ills
of Chapter 11.

B. A Closer Look at ?replanned Adjustments to the Capital
Structure
Preplanned adjustments represent an important departure from the
auction-based proposals discussed in the previous section. By deciding
its response to financial crisis in advance, the firm eliminates almost all
of the direct costs of bankruptcy. Such a regime obviates both the need
for an ex post judicial (as in current Chapter 11) or market (as with an

50.
The problem is one of transaction costs, and is analogous to the familiar
observation in contract law that transaction costs may preclude parties from bargaining
around an inappropriate default rule . See , e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps
in Incomplete ConJracts: An Economic Theory of DefaulJ Rules , 99 YALE L.J. 87, 109-11
(1989).
51.
Aghion, Hart, and Moo re suggest that the problem could be alleviated by the
development of a market for the parties' options, but the likelihood of a competitive
options market seems negligible for small and medium sized firm s, and problematic even
with respect to pub licly held debtors.
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auction) valuation, and the need for costly ex post bargaining among the
parties. In effect, we shift with this proposal 52 from a partially marketbased alternative, to an entirely market-based one.
Two related defects raise serious questions about the proposal,
however. First, the costs of negotiating a capital structure in advance
could outweigh, and at the least would reduce, the ex post benefits. 53
A debtor would incur these costs even if shifting to the special capital
structure never became necessary. 54 Only if insolvency were relatively
likely, or the costs of negotiation low, would preplanned adjustments
seem a promising solution to the inefficiencies of current Chapter 11.
Even if these conditions were present, the firm would need to consider
whether suppliers and other third parties might be hesitant to do business
with a firm that has already crafted a tailor-made framework for dealing
with its own insolvency.
Second, choosing an insolvency capital structure in advance requires
the parties to predict the future. If the firm guessed wrong about the
likely source of financial difficulties, changed significantly between its
inception and the time it encountered trouble, or both, the special
insolvency structure could prove wholly ineffective. To be sure, the
parties could attempt to adjust their prearranged structure midstream in
an effort to address changed conditions, but negotiations of this sort
would be costly and frequently unsuccessful. 55 In short, the initial
negotiating costs and the possibility that midstream adjustments might
become necessary would significantly limit the usefulness of preplanned
adjustments for many, and perhaps almost all, firms.

52.
As noted earlier, neither Rasmussen nor Schwartz argues that debtors should
be required to adopt a finn-specific capital structure. Rather, they suggest that some
debtors might do so if given the opportunity.
53.
Even if a debtor were to adopt a preplanned adjustment strategy unilaterally,
she still would incur both the costs of devising an appropriate framework, and the costs
of persuading current and future creditors to agree to the plan.
54.
Adler, Financial and Political T7Jeories, supra note 32, at 322.
55 .
See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts,
67 VA. L. REv. 1089 (1981). Rasmussen's response to the possibility of midstream
changes by a debtor in its choice from a "menu" of possible insolvency regimes is
hampered by closely analogous problems and therefore is not a solution to the dilemma.
Rasmussen, supra note 29, at 117-18. Rasmussen argues that unanimous creditor consent
should be required as a prerequisite to any menu selection change that could be the result
of strategic behavior by the debtor. Alteration of a tailor-made insolvency structure would
inevitably fit this definition. Thus, the holdout and negotiation costs discu ssed in the text
would always come into play.
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C. Another Look at Contingent/Chameleon Equity
The contingent/chameleon equity proposal proffered by Bradl ey and
Rosenzweig, and by Adler, can be seen as an off-th e-rack version of
prearranged capital structure. Simply committing to cancel current equity
in the event of default, as these commentators propose, saves the parties
the costs of negotiating a firm-specific insolvency capital structure and
appears to address the twin goals of disciplining management and
avoiding the expense of a prolonged bankruptcy proceeding. 56 The
proposal also would introduce significant costs, however. Given the
particular prominence of this proposal, I discuss th e costs in some detail
below.

1.

THE LIQUIDITY PROBLEM

Initial cnticism has focused upon Bradley and Rosenzweig's
suggestion that the cancellation of equity would rarely be triggered by
premature defaults, as one might fear. So long as the firm is solvent, its
managers could solve any cash flow problems by issuing additional
equity . Critics have pointed out that this proposal, like the options
alternative discussed above, assumes that markets function with perfect
efficiency: Managers must be able to raise money quickly and cheaply,
in an equity market that assesses accurately the value of the firm. 57
In the context of publicly held firms, it is at least remotely possible
that the market would function somewhat as Bradley and Rosenzweig
imagine. To assess the cost of a contingent/chameleon equity regime, one
would need to consider the very significant costs of raising equity. 58
One must also take into account the lagtime between th e decision to issue
equity and actual receipt of the funds . Only if firms could predict a cash
crunch sufficiently far in advance, would the equity solution prove
effective .59 A final concern is the risk that cash-strapped firms might be
forced to sell equity at artificially low, "fire sale"' prices.w Inability to

56.
Se e sup ra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
57.
Se e , e. g., LoPucki, supra note 5, at 99-101.
58.
See, e. g., HARRY G . HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF
CORPORATIONS 78 6-91 (3d ed . 1983) (describing the costs and proced ures of a public
issuance of securities).
59.
The time problem is likely to be partic ula rly ac ute if the iss uance is a public
o ffe rin g and req uires co mpliance with the strictures o f the Securities Act o f 1933. !d.
60 .
Firms gen erally try to time their iss uance of equ ity to favo rable ma rket
co nditions , which need not necessarily be directly co rrelated with the underlyin g value o f
the co rporatio n in question, so as to maxi mize th e price they receive . Se e, e.g., Udaya n
Gupta & Brent Bowe rs, !PO Slump Is Stalling Expansion of Small Busin esses , W ALL ST.
1. , July 2, 1992 , at B2 (describing finm ' decis ions to ho ld off o r scale back o n plan ned
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wait even so much as a week or month could prove particularly costly for
a firm. On the other ha..11d, many large firms do look to the equity
markets for help with their cash flow problems. General Motors, for
example, issued equity several times in recent years in response to
balance sheet problems that had made other forms of financing
unattractive. To the extent it might force managers to be more judicious
in their use of debt, and to the extent the option of issuing equity is
available to address temporary crises, contingent/chameleon equity has
some initial appeal for a publicly held firm.
Closely held and other small and medium-sized firms are an entirely
different story. Issuance of equity is not a viable response to financial
difficulties for many of these firms, since the transaction costs alone of
a new public issue are likely to be prohibitive. 61 Moreover, investors
may hesitate to acquire a minority interest in a close corporation, and
dilution of control would undermine many of the virtues of a closely held
firm. 62 Downsizing, or sales of nonessential assets , would be equally
unavailable as alternatives for firms whose value is tied up in crucial
equipment. In short, the liquidity problem alone raises serious doubts
about contingent/chameleon equity for all but a narrow slice of publicly
held firms. The proposal also suffers from additional defects with respect
to both these and smaller firms.
2.

STRATEGIC BEHA VlOR IN PUBLICLY HELD CORPORATIONS

A recurring problem with forfeiture rules-rules that eliminate one
party's interest if a specified triggering event occurs-is that they create
enormous incentives for strategic behavior. The treatment of express
conditions in contract law is a particularly good example of this
phenomenon. Because contract law excuses one party to a contract from
performing if the other fails to satisfy a condition, regardless of how
trivial the defect in performance, a nonbreaching party can use the failur e
strategically, as a means of escaping a contract the nonbreaching party has
come to regret. 63

offerings rather than sell equity at ftre sale prices). A firm faced with immediate eq uity
cancellation obviously would be forced to accept whatever price the market would pay.
See Robert E. Scou, A Relational Theory of Secured Transactions, 86 COLUM .
61.
L. REV. 901, 915-16 (19 86) [hereinafter ScoU, A Relational Theory].
62 .
!d. at 914- 15 (describ ing a debtor's incentive to shirk or engage in self-dea lin g
if her ownership share is diminished).
The case o f Intem atio-Rotterdam , Inc . v. River Brand Rice Mills, Inc . , 259
63 .
F .2d 137 (2d Cir. 1958), is illu strati ve . In lnternatio-Rotterdam, a forward co ntract
required the seller to delive r 95 ,600 pockets of rice to the buye r the fo llowing December ,
at a co ntract price o f $8. 25 per pocket. De livery was co nd itioned o n selle r 's receipt of
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Both Bradley and Rosenzweig, and Adler neglect thi s probiem; yet,
in publicly held firms, contingent equity would create a serious risk of
similar opportunism. First, like a nonbreaching party in the express
condition context, the unsecured creditors of a publicly held firm could
use u1e equity cancellation rule to divert value from shareholders to
themselves. To appreciate how this might work , consider a corporation
that owes $7,000,000 to senior creditors and $2,000,000 to junior
unsecured creditors, and whose total value is roughly $10,000,000.
Unsecured creditors would have a tremendous incentive to call for equity
cancellation if management violated a technical default provision, because
doing so would give them 100% of th e equity of a firm that now had a
net value of $3,000,000. 64 In fact, th e bondholders' trustee might even
be liable for breach of fiduciary duty if she jailed to take advantage of
this opportunity: In particular, if the firm later experienced serious
financial difficulties, bondholders might contend that the trustee should
have taken action earlier, when bondholder values could have been
salvaged.
The parties might attempt to curb the threat of strategic behavior by
adjusting the default provisions in their debt contracts. One might expect
to see fewer "early warning signal" default provisions, and a greater
reliance on default provisions (such as payment terms and prohibitions on
the sale of essential assets) likely to be triggered only in the event of true,
nontemporary financial reverses, as well as more widespread use of cure
provisions . Unfortunately, while restricting the breadth of debt contract
default terms in this fashion might reduce strategic behavior somewhat,

shipping instructio ns from buyer two weeks in advance . !d. at 139. By December, the
market price had risen to $9 .75 per pocket. When the buyer neglected to provide the
instructions sufficiently early both to give the seller two weeks notice and to allow for
delive ry befo re the end of December, the seller immediatel y rescinded the contract. Id.
The court found for the seiier , holding that the buyer's failure to strictly comply with the
conditions of delivery released the seller from its ob ligations . !d. at 140 .
Not surprisingly, courts have mitigated the harshness o f the strict compliance rule
in some cases by invoking exceptions such as the substantial performance rule, see , e.g. ,
Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, 129 N.E. 88 9 (N.Y. 1921 ), or by finding that the nonbreaching
party waived the condition. See Universal Builders, Inc . v. Moon Moto r Lodge , Inc . ,
244 A.2d 10 (Pa. 1968) . One suspects that, to the extent the parties did not limit the
contingent/chameleon equity default term or provide fo r a cure period, as discussed
below, courts would develop similar exceptions so as to aiieviate the regime's more
problematic conseq uences.
Thu s, the effect o f equity cancellation is to increas e the value o f the unsecured
64.
creditors ' inte rest from $2 million to $3 million. U nsccu red cred ito rs' strategic incentives
might seem to be red uced if they arc significant playe rs in both the equity and the debt
ma rkets, since eq uity canceii ation would, in a sense, be ro bb in g Peter to pay Paul. But
there wiii always be players in a given firm whose interests are only in debt (and dual
playe rs mi ght still be tempted if, with respect to th e firm in questio n, they onl y own debt) .
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it also would seriously increase the indirect costs of financial
difficulties. 65 Faced with the prospect of equity cancellation, managers
would attempt to forestall the day of reckoning by juggling balance sheets
and foregoing current opportunities; unsecured creditors would be largely
unable to nip these stalling tactics in the bud. 66
The second strategic behavior problem arises from the uncertainty as
to who will manage the firm in the event of an equity cancellation. Adler
suggests that the firm's new shareholders, its current unsecured creditors,
should vote on the managers. 67 The vote he envisions would entail
significant expense, including both the direct costs of holding an election
and the indirect costs of forgone opportunities during the time before a
management team is firmly in place. 68 The prospect of these costs,
together with the prospect of substantial indirect costs prior to default,
would give unsecured creditors an incentive to strike a deal with the
firm's current managers. The unsecured creditors might offer a side
payment, or agree to keep the current managers in place after the equity
cancellation, in return for the managers' agreement not to make
extraordinary efforts to forestall default. 69
In short, in a contingent/chameleon equity regime, unsecured
creditors could divert value from shareholders to themselves by either
strategically invoking default provisions in their debt contract or colluding
with management, or both.

65.
The analysis in the text therefore suggests that, as with an auction regime,
contingent/chameleon equity would not eliminate, and might not even reduce, the indirect
costs of insolvency. Instead, it would simply shift these costs forward in time, so that
costs occurred before rather than during bankruptcy.
66.
Moreover, neither narrower defaults nor even provisions giving the debtor a
cure period would fully eliminate the risk of strategic behavior. Whereas bankruptcy
currently acts as a credible threat for debtors, and restrains creditors from declaring
default opportunistically, unsecured creditors in a contingent/chameleon equity regime
would have an incentive to enforce strictly any cure provision.
67.
Adler, Financial and Political Theories, supra note 32, at 324.
68.
Another major problem with the management decision is the question of who
will act as the unsecured creditors' agent in connection with the vote. Outside of
bankruptcy, current management performs this function, as for example by nominating
a slate of directors and recommending them to shareholders. Current managers obviously
would be a poor choice of agents for the unsecured creditors in the wake of an equity
cancellation. Unlike current Chapter 11, which employs committee representation as a
means of addressing the parties' coordination costs, Bankruptcy Code § 1103, the
contingent/chameleon equity proposal leaves this issue completely up in the air.
69.
While managers who took such a side payment would be subject to suit for
breach of their duty of loyalty if they somehow were caught, it is not clear that the ousted
shareholders would have any direct recourse against the firm's unsecured creditors. In
other words, the threat of a fiduciary duty suit is likely to be a poor deterrent.
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MONITORlNG GONE AMOK: THE COST OF CREDIT IN
CLOSELY HELD CONTINGENT/CHAMELEON FIRMS

As discussed above, the liquidity problem aJone makes
contingent/chameleon equity aJmost completely implausible for firms that
are not publicly held. Liquidity is not the only problem in this context,
however. The proposaJ would aJso undermine the use of secured credit
and, as a result, significantly increase monitoring and thus overaJl credit
costs. To appreciate the extent of the problem, it is necessary first to
briefly describe the role of secured and unsecured credit.

a. Monitoring and the choice of capital structure
While the role of debt as a mechanism for disciplining managers and
thus diminishing their conflicts of interest is well understood ,70 firms'
use of different kinds of debt-particularly the choice between secured
and unsecured credit-has proven to be an enduring puzzle. The most
persuasive explanations for secured credit emphasize the bonding effect
of security and the monitoring role that secured creditors perform ,
arguing that secured credit offers efficiencies in policing the debtor that
reduce the overaJl cost of credit. 71 The theories are limited, however,

70.
Because it imposes fixed obligations on a flnn and thus limits excess cash,
debt gives managers a narrower margin of e rror. The effect is to increase the likelihood
that incompetence will be exposed, and also to reduce managers' ability to engage in selfdealing. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate
Finance, and Takeovers , AM . EcoN . R EV., May 1986, at 323 . On the other hand,
because excessive debt may cause managers to take too many risks, and introduces the
threat of bankruptcy , firms also tend to include a significant amount of equity in their
capital structures . See , e. g. , Michael C . Jensen & William H. Meckling , Theory ofth e
Finn: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Own ership Structure, 3 J . FIN . ECON . 305
(1976) .
71.
See, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing
and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143 (1979); Saul Levmore, Monitors and
Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Seuings , 92 YALE L.J. 49 (1982) (correcting
Jackson and Kronman 's counterintu itive ass umption that unsecured creditors are the best
monito rs); Scott, A Relational Theory , sup ra note 61. Other important , nonmonito ring
efforts to explain secured fmancing include Frank Buckley 's contention that security
reduces screening costs, Francis H. Buckley , The Bankruptcy Priority Puzzle , 72 VA. L.
R EV. 1393 (1986), and James White's hypoth esis that security addresses problems o f
differential risk aversion. James J. White, Efficiency Justifications f or Personal Property
Security , 37 VAND . L. R EV. 473 (1 984). See also Clifford W. Smith , Jr. & Jerold B.
Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. EcoN . 117
(1979) ; James H. Scott, Bankruptcy, Sec ured Debt, and Optimal Capital Structure, 32 J.
FIN. 1 (1977). Alan Schwartz has authored several impo rtant articles pointing out the
limitations o f the various theo ries . Alan Schwartz, Th e Continuing Puzzle of Secured
Debt , 37 VAND. L. R EV. !051 (1984); Alan Schwartz, Security Int erests and Bankruptcy
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by their failure to explore the precise nature and full range of monitoring
efforts. 72
By developing a simple typoiogy of monitoring, one which draws
from Adler's insights as well as those of other scholars, we can greatly
enhance the explanatory power of current theories. Creditors monitor in
either or both of·two ways: First, they investigate the debtor before
extending credit; second, some continue to monitor even after the loan
documents are signed. 73 Creditors that engage in both preloan and
midstream monitoring can be described as active monitors. Those that
only investigate initially (and simply watch for payment defaults
thereafter) are passive monitors. 74
Active monitoring-which may consist of policing assets, maintaining
frequent contact, and even participating in the debtor's decision making
processes-generally is far more expensive than passive monitoring. One
would therefore expect to see more active monitoring in contexts where
the debtor's conflicts of interest are particularly high: when the firm has
a high debt/equity ratio, for instance, or when there is significant
variability in the risk of the debtor's investment opportunities. 75 The
existence of one or more active monitors does not mean that other
creditors do not monitor at all; rather, they may monitor passively. 76

Priorities: A Review of Current Theories, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1981). Schwartz recently
has argued that Article 9's current treatment of secured credit should be largely abolished
and replaced with a more true first-in-time regime. Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan
Priorities, 18 1. LEGAL STUD. 209 (1989).
72.
See BARRY E. ADLER, A NEW PERSPECfiVE ON THE BANKRUPTCY PRIORITY
PuzzLE, (Emory University Law and Economics Working Paper No. 31, 1991)
[hereinafter Adler, A New Perspective].
73.
Adler points out the distinction in a new article, focusing in particular on the
importance to dispersed equity holders of the pre-loan investigation done by unsecured
creditors. Adler makes the important point that unfavorable changes in the terms insisted
upon by unsecured creditors will act as a signal to shareholders, warning them of potential
problems. !d. at 22-23.
74 .
The terms "active" and "passive" are taken from Levmore. Levmore, supra
note 71, at 74-75.
See, e.g. , Francis H. Buckley, The Termination Decision, at 21-24 (1992)
75.
(unpublished manuscript) . Buckley argues that termination, whether it be through
foreclosure, bankruptcy, or some other means, should occur when equity's adverse
incentives exceed those of creditors, and that the optimal termination point is affected by
factors such as the debUequity ratio and variability of risk .
76.
Thus, suppliers of a close corporation will frequently consult the Dun &
Bradstreet report on a particular firm prior to extending credit and, if problems develop,
during the course of the parties' relationship. Similarly , the bond trustee representing
widely scattered bondholders of a publicly held firm will review the finn's public filings
for evidence of trouble. The use of Dun & Bradstreet and the appointment of a bond
trustee can be seen as mechanisms for overcoming the co llective action problems of
dispersed creditors.
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Secured credit can be seen as a mecha.I1ism for minimizing the
expense of active monitoring. 77 First, the bonding aspects of secured
credit-debtors' agreement to give a priority interest and to furnish
ongoing documentation concerning the collateral-both deter misbehavior
in the first instance a11d streamline the monitoring process .78 Security
also eliminates duplication of effort and the flipside problem of
undermonitoring. 79 Secured credit achieves this efficiency by paying the
best monitor, through its promise of priority, to do the active
monitoring; 00 other creditors may then take advantage of the fruits of the
secured creditor's efforts. 81
This analysis helps explain the frequent absence of secured credit in
publicly held corporations. Active monitoring may be unnecessary if the
firm's debt/equity ratio is sufficiently low. 82 Moreover, the frequent
issuance and rollover of debt has a readily observable signalling effect

77.
Scott has given the most extensive account of active monitoring in connection
with his relational theory of secured financing. Scott, A Relational Theory, supra note
61, at 946-50.
78 .
Rather than visiting the debtor's business on a monthly basis, a bank may be
able to review monthly leases or accounts receivable forwarded by the debtor, as well as
changes in the debtor's bank account. Banks' ability to insist that the debtor maintain an
account with them is one reason they are Likely to be such good monitors. The bank
account is relatively easy to monitor and also serves as a bonding device, because it gives
the bank a source of setoff in the event the debtor fails to repay.
79.
Levmore, supra note 71, at 55-57. It is interesting to note that secured
lending in the publicly held firm context is often done by a syndicate of banks, rather than
by a single bank . The presence of multiple banks enables each to limit its exposure, and
does not create insuperable collective action problems because the group ordinarily is
small enough to permit coordination of efforts. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF
COLLECITVE ACTJON: PuBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (2d ed. 1971);
RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTfV E ACTION (1982).
80 .
One difficulty with monitoring explanations of secured credit is that, because
it reduces a creditor's risk, security seems to decrease the incentive to monitor. See
Buckley, Th e Bankruptcy Priority Puzzle, supra note 71, at 1440. However, secured
creditors still have substantial (even if not perfect) incentives to monitor if their collateral
does not significantly exceed the amount of the loan. In addition, many secured creditors
have an interest not only in th e present Joan, but also in the possibility of future
transactions if the debtor is successful. See infra notes 84, 85.
One question that arises is, how do unsecured creditors benefit from secured
81.
creditor monitoring? Most importantly, other creditors benefit from the press ure secured
creditor monitoring puts on a debtor to fully perform , rather than to shirk o r othe rwise
fail to max.1mize the value o f the corporation.
82 .
By contrast, we might expect to see an increase in secured credit with firm s
with investment opportunities whose risks are particularly va riable o r suddenly c hange for
the worse. Note, however, that there also are other reaso ns for securing, such as secured
creditors' superior treatment in bankruptcy (includi.11g the possib ility of receivi ng pendency
interest under Bankruptcy Code§ 506(b)).
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that further reduces the need for additional monitoring. 83 By contrast,
closely held firms almost always have significant debt and a relatively
small equity interest, thus necessitating a particularly active monitor. 84
Armed with the stranglehold of Article 9's priority rules, the debtor's
secured creditor fills this role. 85

b. The cost of the contingent/chameleon
The problem with contingent/chameleon equity in this context is that
it would impair a secured creditor's ability to actively monitor closely
held debtors in the fashion described above. Because default has such
draconian consequences in a contingent/chameleon equity regime, and
because they are unlikely to find alternative financing if they encounter
even temporary financial problems, closely held debtors would be even
more concerned with narrowing the scope of default terms, or including
cure provisions, than the publicly held debtors discussed earlier. 86 Yet
loss of the leverage afforded by the current panoply of default terms
would significantly limit a secured creditor's ability to actively monitor,
particularly with respect to intangible problems such as shirking or
underperformance. Moreover, Adler proposes to abolish the foreclosure
rights of secured creditors, another important source of leverage over the
debtor. 87

83.
See Adler, A New Perspective, supra note 72, at 20-21.
84.
This account suggests that secured creditors may often play different roles in
publicly held, as opposed to closely held corporations. Even a risky publicly held
corporation is likely to have a significant equity interest, thus diminishing (at least
marginally) a secured creditor's risks. As a result, the secured creditors of a publicly held
finn seem less likely to engage in some forms of particularly active monitoring, such as
involvement in the debtor's decision-making process.
Scott argues that the relationship between a secured creditor and the debtor
85.
in many close corporations becomes so close as to make them almost like joint venturers.
In return for the situational monopoly Article 9 gives it, the secured creditor may provide
business expertise that many debtors could not otherwise afford, as well as an ongoing
source of funding. ScoU, A Relational Theory, supra note 61.
86.
The familiar "insecurity" clause, which permits a secured creditor to declare
a default if it loses confidence in a debtor's ability to repay, see U.C.C. § 1-208 (1977)
(imposing a good faith limitation on exercise of insecurity clauses), is one example of a
default provision that would become problematic in a contingent/chameleon equity regime.
87.
Adler, Financial and Political Theories, supra note 32, at 332. Bradley and
Rosenzweig propose that creditors retain their individual default rights. Bradley &
Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 1085 n.98. However, as Adler poinL~ out, retention by
creditors of their default rights would completely undermine the contingent/chameleon
equity regime, and thus seems incompatible with the proposal, since it would reintroduce
the problem of races to the courthouse by creditors (and possible dismemberment of the
firm). Adler, Financial and Political Theories, supra note 32, at 332-33.
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In effect, contingent/chameleon equity shifts auL1ority to a firm's
unsecured creditors, because they, rather than the secured creditor, will
decide the firm's fate in the first instance in the event of a default.
Unsecured creditors' newfound authority would force them to take a much
more active role in the monitoring process. Rather than relying primarily
on the secured bank, unsecured creditors would be required to negotiate
with the debtor over the terms of her continued employment, to find new
managers, or to move forward with liquidation. The prospect of this
responsibility would require more active involvement throughout the life
of the loan. 88
Contingent/chameleon equity thus substitutes a regime with many
active monitors for one with a single active monitor and numerous passive
Moreover, many of these monitors-trade creditors in
ones. 89
particular-are particularly unlikely to shoulder this responsibility
effectively.>() By undermining the role of secured credit, and reinjecting
unsecured creditors into the process, contingent/chameleon equity would
significantly increase the overall cost of credit in closely held firms.
In theory, the parties could simply agree among themselves to vest
decision-making authority in the secured creditor if they wished.
Moreover, if a closely held firm is truly in financial trouble, the secured
creditor could end up in control even in the absence of such an
agreement, since unsecured creditors (as the new shareholders) may not
find it in their interest to cure all of the firm's defaults. Rather than
vindicating contingent/chameleon equity, however, these arguments
reinforce the earlier conclusion that the proposal is particularly unsuited
for closely held firms. If broader secured creditor control is desirable,
a better solution would achieve this objective directly.

88.
In the alternative, unsecured creditors might simply fail to monitor, or
monitor very little, because (due to its abolition of individual default rights)
contingent/chameleon equity does not permit any individual creditor to reap the rewards
of its monitoring. Rather, monitoring becomes a collective good that must be shared with
the entire class. Stated differently, contingent/chameleon equity reintroduces , and
arguably exacerbates, the very collective action and duplication of effort problems that
secured credit currently helps to solve. Se e Lev more, supra note 71, at 55-57.
Or, as suggested in the previous footn ote, it might create a regime that lacks
89 .
any sufficiently active monito r, if no unsecured creditor ass umes the mo nitoring
responsibility .
90.
See Schwa rtz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities, supra note 71, at
11 n.28; Levmore, supra note 71, at 53.
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D. A World with No Bankruptcy

Eliminating bankruptcy and relegating the parties to the state law
collection regime , as Bowers suggests, holds promis e in cases involving
a debtor and a secured creditor that is likely to be undersecured in the
event of a default. In these cases, bankruptcy often simply postpones an
inevitable liquidation and, in doing so, generates significant deadweight
costs. Because the secured creditor has an incentive to liquidate only if
long term prospects are bleak, its decision arguably should be respected
in the first instance.
Bowers does not limit his critique of Chapter 11 to this context,
however. His view of the debtor as the best liquidator argues for
abolition of bankruptcy in a much broader array of cases. The first
problem with his proposal is that its predictions conflict with observed
reality . Bowers posits that debtors will use security as a means of
insuring optimal liquidation in the event of loss. They may grant security
in key assets-that is, assets essential to a debtor's business-to creditors
likely to be among the last to liquidate and leave less critical, more easily
liquidated assets (such as accounts receivable) to aggressive creditors .91
In practice, however, debtors who use secured credit frequently give
bl anket security interests to their financing lender. 92 One rarely observes
the subtle apportioning of security interests that Bowers's analysis has in
mind.
More importantly, the proposal would lead to the dismemberment of
many corporations that are more valuable as going concerns. Mediumsized and large firms would be particularly vulnerable in this respect.
Given their fixed upside return, many creditors would have little incentive
to wait patiently as the debtor sought either to renegotiate or to arrange
a sale of the firm. State law grace periods and other stalling techniques,
which might afford adequate time for firms that need only negotiate with
or cure defaults with respect to one or two key creditors , would not give
th e managers of firms with more numerous and diverse creditors adequate
breathing space to forestall a piecemeal liquidation. 93

91.
Bowers, Loss Distribution, s upra note 21, at 66-67.
92 .
Article 9 a ffinnatively promotes the use o f blanket security inte rests by not
only enab ling a secured creditor to take a security interest in all of a debtor's present and
a fter acquired as sets , but also giving future advances the same priority as the original loan
(with so me exceptions) if the loan includes a future advances clause. U. C. C . §§ 9-204,
9-31 2(5) (1977).
93.
The use of a "prepackaged bankruptcy " app roac h-that is , negotiating a

cc nft rmable plan prior to ftling for bankruptcy - appea rs to suffe r from c losely ana logou s
limitations. Beca use of the barga ining obstacles, th e approach is most effecti ve if one,
rather th an multiple, class of cred itors ' interests are primarily at stake .
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History suggests an additional problem, one which also would be
particularly acute outside of the context of closely held firms. Prior to
the enactment of section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act in 1934, the fate of
financially distressed firms was played out almost exclusively in state
foreclosure and receivership proceedings and their federal counterparts. 94
In ot.l-:ler words, businesses once operated in a regime strikingly similar to
the one currently proposed. 95 The widespread perception that this
system facilitated collusion sparked the decision to undertake a vast
reformation of the nation's insolvency laws. Critics of the equity
receivership process were particularly concerned that management and
senior creditors conspired to squeeze out bondholders and other widely
dispersed investors. 96
While investors are probably less vulnerable now than they were in
the early decades of the century, one suspects that strategic behavior
might once again become a more pressing problem in the absence of
bankruptcy. This threat, together with the risk of undesirable and ·
unnecessary dismemberment, makes elimination of bankruptcy a
particularly unattractive alternative for all but a limited class of closely
held firms.

E. Summary
Each of the new propos<Ys to replace Chapter 11 is problematic in
important respects. Both the auction proposals and contingent/chameleon
equity hold promise only for publicly held corporations. Even in that
context, mandatory auctions would suffer from a lack of bidders; and
contingent/chameleon equity assumes the existence of smoothly
functioning markets for the equity of an insolvent debtor, and would give
rise to significant strategic behavior problems even if the assumption held
true. In contrast to auctions and contingent/chameleon equity, eliminating

It might be argued that the parties themselves could negotiate around the problem
by agreeing in advance not to exercise their foreclosure rights on default. Even if such
a solution were possible (which is questionable under current law, since the original
creditors could not bind subsequent creditors to the scheme), it would defeat the whole
point of Bowers's approach, which emphasizes the value of individual collection.
94.
See 8 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM'N, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND
INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, ACriYITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCfiONS OF PROTECfiVE
AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES 5-9 (1940) [hereinafter SEC REPORT].
95.
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was in place during this time, and provided a
federal bankruptcy law, but it was not geared for the reorganization of corporations with
publicly held securities and was rarely used in that context. ld. at 62-81.
96.
See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS,
AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 35 (2d ed . 1990); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228
U.S. 482 (1913).
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bankruptcy makes no sense for a publicly held co rp oration, although it
does seem attractive for so me closely held firm s. 97
Give n the limited range of firms for which each mi ght prove at least
margin all y effect ive, it is tempting to mix and match the proposals : to
propose co ntingent/chamel eo n equity for publicly held corporations, for
instance , and th e elimination of Chapter 11 in th e co ntext of closely held
firms. Anoth er possibility would be to permit each firm to decid e for
itself, that is, to includ e the proposals in a menu of bankruptcy options
fo r firms to choose from in connection with th eir initial incorporation. 98
Each of these possibiliti es would be far from perfect, yet they raise an
important practical question. Assuming that commentators developed an
alternative that cl early was superior to Chapter 11 , would Congress
recognize this and actually adopt it? I address thi s question in u'le
following part and in doing so, shed additional light on the proposed
alternatives to Chapter 11.

Ill .

THE POLITICS OF BANKRUPTC Y

In this part, I move from a normative analysis of each of the
proposals to the more practical question posed at the conclusion of the
previous part: Is it plausible to assume that Congress would adopt any
proposal that jettisoned Chapter 11? Based on an analysis drawn from the
public choice literature, Barry Adler contends that it is not, concluding
instead that interest group pressures would and will thwart any effort to
adopt even a more efficient insolvency process. 99 I argue that he
ultimately is right, at least with respect to the current proposals, but for
the wrong reasons. I begin by critiquing his public choice analysis.

97.
The preplanned capital structure proposal does not seem more appropriate for
either close or publicly held corporations. While the risk of bankruptcy is likely to be
greater in the close corporation context, sophisticated capital structure adjustments seem
more likely to be useful for publicly held corporations. Unfortunately, the negotiating
costs and the difficulty of making midstream adjustments would probably outweigh the
proposal's benefits in either context.
98 .
This is the approach Rasmussen would implement. Rasmussen, supra note
29.
99.
Adler, Financial and Political Theories, supra note 32, at 341-46.
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A. Public Choice and Bankruptcy Leg islation
1.

LIMITATIONS OF TH E STANDARD INTEREST GROUP APPROACH

In its simplest form , public choice theory posits that legislati on (or
the failure to enact legislation) 100 frequently benefits concentrated, wellorga.11ized interest groups at the expense of more diffuse interests.
Although the total cost of the legisl ation to a diffuse group may exceed
its benefits to the more concentrated one, th e cost to each individual
member of a diffuse group is small. As a result, th e diffuse group
members do not have sufficient incentives to generate effective
opposition. 101
Adler argues that two concentrated groups , the corporate and
bankruptcy bars a.ild corporate managers, benefit from the current,
inefficient version of Chapter 11. The corporate and bankruptcy bars
have a significant sunk investment in their exp ertise with respect to extant
laws, and thus can be expected to oppose any move from the status
quo. 102 Corporate managers are likely to challenge any proposal that
diminishes their control over a corporate debtor. Contingent/chameleon
equity has precisely this effect: Unlike Chapter 11, which permits
managers to stay in charge, contingent/chameleon equity would subject
managers to a vote of confidence and likely dismissal in the event of
default. As a result, the prospect of its adoption also would provoke
aggressive opposition from managers. 103
By contrast, investors such as shareholders and bondholders would
favor an improved bankruptcy procedure, since elimination of the
inefficiencies of Chapter 11 would increase the present value of their
investments. 104 Unlike the corporate and bankruptcy bars and corporate

100.
See Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REv. 339,
367 (1988) (emphasizing that public choice analysis does not focus simply on the passage
of legislation).
101.
ld. at 343 . See also Sam Peltzman, Towards a More General Theory of
Economic Regulation, 19 J. LAW & ECON . 211 (1976); George T. Stigler, The Theory of
Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcoN. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971) .
102.
Adler, Financial and Political Theories, supra note 32, at 343-44.
103.
!d. at 344-45.
104.
In addition to the direct effect on shareholders' current investments, an
improved insolvency regime would marginally increase the value of all corporations. Cf.
Donald E. Schwartz, In Praise of Derivarive Suits: A Commentary on the Paper of
Professors Fischel and Bradley, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 322, 331 (1986) (arguing that
derivative litigation is justified in large part by its general, ex ante deterrent effect). In
theory, one would expect shareholders to be most concerned about their current
investments, since the price of any future investments should reflect the value of an
improved regime. In practice, they appear to be interested in improving the future

496

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

managers, hmvever, both of whom are weil orga.1ized and have
concentrated interests in the status of ba..'1kmptcy Jaw, 105 investors are
poorly organize{}, and each has only a limited stake; the interest of each
investor arnounts only to the increased recovery she could expect under
a more efficient insolvency regime, multiplied by the (relatively small)
probability that insolvency will in fact occur. 106 According to Adler,
well-organized bankruptcy lawyers and corporate managers will
outcompete diffuse investors for the ears of their legislators and would
stymie any effort to adopt a superior law. 107
Even on its own terms, the story is problematic in several respects.
First, at least in the context of publicly held firms, investors are not
nearly so diffuse and disorganized as Adler represents. Institutional
investors have in recent years accumulated significant percentages of the
stock (as well as debt instruments) of America's publicly held
corporations. 108 In the corporate law context, such investors have taken
an active role in opposing antitakeover provisions and other measures that
they see as inconsistent with their interests. 109 While it is unclear
whether institutional investors would have sufficient incentives to make
a similar stand with respect to bankruptcy reform, the potential benefits

playing field as well.
105.
Unlike investors, managers and corporate and bankruptcy attorneys are
limited in their ability to diversify their interests to reduce their risks. Managers in
particular may have a large proportion of their tangible and intangible assets invested in
the firm they manage. Lawyers can diversify more easily: Should bankruptcy law change
dramatically or disappear, they could develop a nascent expertise in litigation or tax law;
but they also are at risk, especially in a difficult economic climate. It is in this sense,
together with the fact that both groups are relatively discrete, that managers' and
corporate and bankruptcy lawyers' interests are particularly concentrated.
106.
As suggested in the preceding footnote, investors such as shareholders and
bondholders also are much better able to diversify their investments and thus to
significantly reduce their risk.
107.
Adler, Financial and Political Theories, supra note 32, at 343-46.
108.
See Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional
Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 447-50 (1991); John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity
Versus Control: 1JJe Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
1277 (1991); Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional
Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REv. 811 (1992) [hereinafter Black, Agents Watching
Agents]; BernardS. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520
(1990) [hereinafter Black, Shareholder Passivity].
109.
Everyone agrees that institutional shareholders have begun to play a much
more important role in corporate governance in recent years. Where the commentators
join issue is in their predictions as to how much this activism will actually improve the
management of publicly held corporations. Compare Rock, supra note 108 (pessimistic
view of institutional shareholder involvement) with Black, Agents Watching Agents, supra
note 108 (optimistic assessment of institutional shareholders' current and future role) and
Black, Shareholder Passivity, supra note 108 (same).
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of an improved regime ar1d th.e relatively low cost of regis tering th eir
suppo rt suggest that managers and the bar may face greater op pos ition
from these investors than Adler envisions.l1°
Another interest group whose presence is omitted from the story is
ba.ILI<.s and other financial institutions. Banks are notoriously well
organized and effective as lobbyists . Among other credits, they are
widely seen as ·having heavily influenced ti.e rules governing secured
transactions in Article 9 of the UCC. While banks are relatively satisfied
with their treatment in Chapter 11, they frequently complain about the
expense and delay of the bankruptcy process. One suspects that banks
would aggressively support legislation that addressed these problems with
Chapter 11. Along with institutional investors, they could provide a
powerful counterbalance to managers and the corporate and bankruptcy
bars. 111
A much more important problem with the standard public choice
opposition between concentrated and diffuse groups is its failure to
acknowledge a crucial piece in the bankruptcy legislation puzzle: the role
of populist ideology. In the article that inspired the title of Adler's piece,
Mark Roe suggests that "[t]he implicit public choice assumption that
ideology doesn't count, or doesn't count much, is usually correct. But
when the broad mass of average people have even a weak preference and

110.
In the final version of his article, Adler acknowledges the lobbying power of
institutional investors (and banks, which are discussed in the following paragraph).
However, he concludes that, because most firms do not become insolvent, the cost of
bankruptcy to these investors is too small to warrant significant reform activity on their
part. Adler, Financial and Political Theories, supra note 32, at 342. Yet it is not
entirely clear that this is true. Rock has pointed out that institutional shareholder activism
is most pronounced with respect to issues whose value increasing or decreasing effect is
clear, and which can be generalized across a wide range of firm s (as opposed to being
finn specific and thus requiring a nontransferable investment by the shareholders). Rock,
supra note 108, at 485. Shareholder opposition, in the form of shareholder resolutions,
to managers' use o f takeover defenses is the mo st visible example of institutional
shareholder activism with respect to such an issue. Jd. at 481-84 (chronicling the
increasing s ucces s of these resolutions in recent years). Bankruptcy reform a rguab ly is
also an example of such an issue, since it would benefit all of the ftrms in which
institutional investors have an interest
111.
It is also interesting to note that although Adler is probably right that
managers wo uld resist reform, he may have overestimated lawyers ' incentives to behave
similarly. Corporate and bankruptcy lawyers have already made a substantial investment
in mastering the current laws, as he suggests, but lawyers as a whole have a strong
interest in promoting change. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller,
Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law , 65 TEX . L. REV . 469,
504-05 (1 987) . The uncertainty created by a new in so lven cy reg ime would generate
substantial new fees both because of its litigation-enhanc ing effect a nd because clients
would look to attorneys for advice as to the likely impa ct of the system. None of th e
proposa ls wo uld so simplify all aspects o f the process as to elim inate these considerations.

498

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

that preference is the sarne for most people, Ll.en ideology does
matter." 112 In Roe's vie·..v, politicians will respond to a perspective that
is sufficiently widely held, even if the individuals are unorganized and
widely scattered. He argues that populist distaste for concentration of
power in the hands of large financial institutions provided a key stimulus
for the laws limiting banks' and other financial institutions' ability to
acquire large blocks of stock in American corporations. 113
The populism story is particularly applicable in the bankruptcy
context. As with large financial institutions, Americans are inherently
distrustful of the managers of major corporations. This traditional distrust
has spawned populist heroes such as William Jennings Bryan, Louis
Brandeis, and William Douglas throughout the nation's history, and has
most recently manifested itself in the widespread outrage at the
astronomical salaries paid to the managers even of struggling
corporations. 114 The current hostility to managers has led both to
shareholder referendums on management compensation and to a Securities
and Exchange Commission proposal that corporations be required to give
a clearer picture of management compensation in their public disclosures.
The public is hardly more sympathetic to lawyers in general and to the
bankruptcy bar in particular . 115 In short, pervasive concern about
managerial accountability and professionals' fees in bankruptcy is a force
that must be reckoned with in assessing the prospects for bankruptcy
reform.
Moreover, the history of bankruptcy in this country offers powerful
confirming evidence that populist ideology looms large in the legislative
process. 116 Almost all of the key reforms implemented by the Chandler

112.
Mark J . Roe, A Political Theory ofAmerican Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM.
L. REv . 10, 31 (1991) (emphasis in o riginal) .
113.
Jd. at 32-36. See also Arthur T. Denzau & Michael C. Munge r, Legislators
and Interest Groups: How Unorgani;:ed Interests Get Represented, 80 AM. PoL. SCJ. REV.
89 (1986) (arguing that voters who have policy preferences are represented e ven if not
organized, because interest groups will focus their attention on legis lators whose
constituency is indifferent as to the iss ue in question) .
114.
See GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS: THE OVERCOMPENSATION
OF THE AMERJCAN EXECUTIVES (1991). President Bush's early 1992 trip to Japan served
as a lightening rod fo r public anger. Both the American and the Japanese press were
quick to point out that the Ame rican a utomobile executives who accompanied Bush made
far more in running much less healthy co mpanies than did their Japanese counterparts.
115.
See, e.g., Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, The Lucrative Business of
Banhuptcy , PHILA. INQ., Oct. 21, 1991, at 1A (second article in series entitled
"America: What Went Wrong? ") (arguing that the "winne rs" in the s urge of bankruptci es
caused by the heavy debt o f the 1980s a re hi gh priced consultants a nd lawyers).
116.
Fo r another context in which populism proved crucial, sec JoHN W.
KING DO N, AG ENDAS , ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 9-13 (1984) (describing how
populist distru st o f big government led to the deregulation of th e airline and trucking
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Act of 1938 were directed at managers and the corporate and bankruptcy
bars, whom future Justice Douglas in particular lambasted as ruthless and
concerned only for their own profits. 117 Chapter X required both that
the managers of a bankrupt debtor be replaced by an independent trustee
in every case within its purview, and that the Securities and Exchange
Commission intervene if the debtor's liabilities exceP..ded $3 million to
ensure the fairness of the reorganization process. 118 The infringements
on managerial discretion ushered in by the Chandler Act could not have
been more complete, yet they passed despite the vitriolic objections of
managers and the bankruptcy bar, who insisted the provisions would
hopelessly bog down the reorganization process. 119
The legislative environment of the 1990s obvious! y differs
significantly from that of the 1930s-populism was particularly potent in
the midst of the Depression. Yet populism has not disappeared and, as
discussed above, appears to have acquired particular force in the wake of
the excesses of the past decade. In addition to considering all of the
relevant interest groups, including the pressure applied by institutional
investors and banks, a more complete public choice story must therefore
also account for the widespread popular antipathy toward managers and
attorneys. Focusing in particular on the contingent/chameleon equity
alternative to Chapter 11, I suggest such a story in the following
subsection.

2.

ANOTHER LOOK AT PUBLIC CHOICE: THE CASE OF
CONTINGENT /CHAMELEON EQUITY

Adler suggests that, even if interest group obstacles might be
overcome in the bankruptcy context, the current status of several areas of
nonbankruptcy law would preclude adoption of the contingent/chameleon

industries despite the countervailing pressure of interest groups such as truckers and the
Teamsters).
117 .
See WIT..LIAM 0. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 175-80 (1940)
(criticizing management control of the reorganization process); I SEC REPORT, supra note
94, at 4 (~Reorganizers frequently have not been concerned, in the manner of investors,
with economy in reorganization, as economy would interfere with their profits.").
118.
See, e.g., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUYTCY LAWS OF THE
UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 244-47 (1973) [hereinafter
1973 COMMISSION REPORT].
119.
Robert T. Swaine, "Democratization" of Corporate Reorganizations, 38
COLUM. L. REv. 256, 277 (1938) . Swaine also complained, among other things, that
~[m]anagement having thus been turned out, there is to be substituted, not action
determined by free negotiation of the sccurityholders among the mselves under leadership
chosen by them, but complete SEC domination of the reorganization process." !d. at 260.
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equity proposal he advocates. Other reform might be possible, but not
the regime he sees as optimal. 120
The most important of these barriers is the Internal Revenue Code.
The tax laws have long allowed corporations to deduct the amounts they
pay as interest on debt, but do not permit deductions for dividends, thus
giving firms a considerable incentive to issue debt rather than equity. 121
A contingent/chameleon equity firm would forego traditional debt in favor
of fixed claims convertible into stock in the event of a default. Adler
contends that the IRS almost certainly would treat these claims as equity
rather than debt under the tax code, and would deny the debt
deduction. 122 Given the huge cost to corporations were they to lose this
deduction, he concludes, contingent/chameleon equity reform would only
be attractive if it also assured that firms would not be penalized from a
tax perspective.
Adler assumes that the only way to achieve this effect would be for
legislators either to eliminate taxation at the corporate level altogether
(either directly or by granting tax credits to investors), or to eliminate the
interest deduction. He suggests that politicians have little incentive to
abolish corporate level taxation, due to the leverage it gives them over
corporate managers, 123 and that the interest deduction may be protected
by deep-seated populist support. 124

120.
In addition to the tax issue discussed in the text below, Adler argues that the
parties' inability to bind themselves and future creditors to a contingenUchameleo n equity
scheme precludes its adoption under current law. This impediment obviously would
disappear if Congress explicitly authorized contingenUchameleon equity. For a discussion
of another of the impediments, the treatment of tort claimants, see infra note 127.
121.
26 U .S.C. § 163(a) (1988); see also WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JoHN C . COFFEE,
JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 317-18 (4th ed. 1990) (noting that current
tax laws give fmns an almost irresistible incentive to leverage) .
122.
Adler, Financial and Political Theories, supra note 32, at 334-35 (noting that
26 U.S .C . § 385(b)(1) defmes debt to require an unconditional promise to pay ).
123 .
I d. at 345 (following Doemberg and McChesney). Fred McChes ney contends
that legislators sometimes threaten to withdraw benefits from an interest group so as to
force the group to "pay" the legislators for a continuation of the status quo. Fred S .
McChesney, Rent Extraction and Interest-Group Organization in a Coasean Model of
Regulation, 20J. LEGALSTUD. 73 (1991). McChesney and Richard Doe mbe rgs uggest
that corpo rate taxes are particularly amenable to legislator rent-seeking of this so rt.
Richard L. Doemberg & Fred S. McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate and Decreasing
Durability of Tax Refonn, 71 MINN. L. REV. 913 (1987).
124 .
Adler, Financial and Political Theories, supra note 32, at 346. Drawing
from a recent article by Daniel Shaviro , see Daniel Shaviro , Beyond Public Cho ice and
Public lnteresr: A Srudy of rhe Legislarive Process as Jllustrared by Tax Leg is/arion in rhe
1980s, 139 U . PA. L. REv . 1, 60-61 (1990), Adler argues that Am erica n voters a rc
willing to deny deductibility to dividends but grant it to interest on debt because they
assoc iate dividends with the wealthy, whereas interest expense is a cost with which they
themsel ves arc familiar.
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This analysis is problematic in two related respects. First, it is not
at all clear that contingent/cha.rneleon equity would in fact be denied debt
status. In giving the Treasury authority to define precisely when a
security is or is not debt under § 385 of the Internal Revenue Code,
Congress suggested that the Treasury take several factors into
consideration, including 1) the existence of a written, unconditional
promise to pay on a reasonable certain date, at a fixed rate of interest; 2)
whether the security is subordinated or preferred; 3) the ratio of debt to
equity; 4) convertibility; and 5) the relationship between investors'
holdings of stock and of the securities in question. As the catalogue
suggests, no single factor is dispositive in determining whether a given
security constitutes debt. 125 In this environment, contingent/chameleon
equity seems very likely to qualify for the interest deduction, especially
given the facts that conversion occurs only on default and that the
securities are not designed for tax avoidance purposes. 1u; Second, even
if the securities failed to qualify as debt, a much simpler proposition than
eliminating corporate level taxation or the interest deduction would be for
Congress to amend the tax code's definition of debt to explicitly include
fixed claims against a contingent/chameleon equity firm. 127
To appreciate why legislators might adopt such a measure, consider
the following story.
Assume that institutional shareholders and
debtholders press Congress to consider replacing bankruptcy with a
contingent/chameleon equity regime, much as they have lobbied for SEC
action and changes at corporations like Sears, Roebuck, and General
Motors. 128 Banks also lobby aggressively in support of the proposals.

125.
BORIS I. BITTKER & lAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS§ 4 .02, at 4-11, 12 & 14 (1987) . Interestingly,
although the Treasury issued regulations for § 385 o f the Interna l Reve nue Code, it
subsequently withdrew them. Courts the refore still are left to their own devices in
determining whether a security qua lifies as debt.
See, e.g. , BITTKER & EUSTICE , supra note 125 , § 4 .03, at 15-20. Th e
126.
leading academic commentary on this issue, altho ug h dated in so me of its deta ils , is a
mass ive work by William T . Plumb , Jr., The Federal In come Tax Significance of
Corporate Debt: A Critical Analysis and a Proposal , 26 TAX L. REV. 369 (1971) .
Another of the ba rriers cited by Adler re lates to the current treatment of tort
127.
claimants . Adler suggests that, because adoptio n of the proposal w ould effectively
subordinate holders of contingenUcham eleo n equity to to rt cla imants, since tort claima nts
currently are deemed to be un secured creditors, sha reho lde rs mig ht be hesitant to suppo rt
c.o ntingenUc hameleon equity. Adle r , Financial and Political Th eories, supra note 32, at
339-40 . This problem wo uld a lso disappear if contin gent/c ha me leon equity w e re a fforded
debt statu s. Moreover , as Adler ac kno wledges in th e fin a l ve rs ion o f his artic le, even if
subo rdinatio n of this so rt we re unavoidable , sha re ho lde rs still might no t be chilled, since
th e likelihood o f massive to rt liabil ity fo r most ftrm s is re lati vely sma ll. /d. at 340.
128 .
See , e. g. , Fra nc ine Sc hwadel, Sears Roeb uc k Seules Lawsuit o ver Directors,
WALL ST. J. , Oct. 28, 199 1, at A9 B (agreement by Sca rs to make "s ubstantial
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equity proposal he advocates. Ot.1er reform might be possibl e, but not
the regime he sees as optimal. 120
The most important of these barriers is the Internal Revenue Code.
The tax laws have long allowed corporations to deduct the amounts they
pay as interest on debt, but do not permit deductions for dividends, thus
giving firms a considerable incentive to issue debt rather than equity. 121
A contingent/chameleon equity firm would forego traditional debt in favor
of fixed claims convertible into stock in the event of a default. Adler
contends that the IRS almost certainly would treat these claims as equity
rather than debt under the tax code, and would deny the debt
deduction. 122 Given the huge cost to corporations were they to lose this
deduction, he concludes, contingent/chameleon equity reform would only
be attractive if it also assured that firms would not be penalized from a
tax perspective.
Adler assumes that the only way to achieve this effect would be for
legislators either to eliminate taxation at the corporate level altogether
(either directly or by granting tax credits to investors), or to eliminate the
interest deduction. He suggests that politicians have little incentive to
abolish corporate level taxation, due to the leverage it gives them over
corporate managers, 123 and that the interest deduction may be protected
by deep-seated populist support. 124

120.
In addition to the tax issue discussed in the text below, Adler argues that the
parties' inability to bind themselves and future creditors to a contingent/chameleon equity
scheme precludes its adoption under current Jaw. This impediment obviously wo uld
disappear if Congress explicitly authorized contingent/chameleon equity . For a disc ussion
of another of the impediments, the treatment of tort claimants, see infra note 127.
121.
26 U .S.C . § 163(a) (1988); s ee also WILLIAM A . KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE ,
JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 317-18 (4th ed. 1990) (noting that current
tax laws give firms an almost irresistible incentive to leverage).
122.
Adler, Financial and Political Theories, supra note 32, at 334-35 (noting that
26 U.S.C . § 385(b)(1) defines debt to require an unconditional pro mise to pay) .
123.
/d. at 345 (following Doemberg and McChesney). Fred McChes ney contends
that legislators sometimes threaten to withdraw benefits from an interest group so as to
force the group to "pay" the legislators for a continuation of the status qu o. Fred S.
McChesney, Rent Extraclion and Interest-Group Organization in a Coasean Model of
Reg ula/ion, 20 J . LEGAL STUD. 73 (1991). McChesney and Richard Doe mberg suggest
that corporate taxes a re particularly amenable to legislato r rent-seeking of thi s so rt.
Richard L. Doemberg & Fred S . McChesney, On the Acceleraling Rate and Decreasing
Durability of Tax Refonn , 71 MINN. L. REV . 913 (1987).
124.
Adler, Financial and Political Theories, supra note 32, at 346. Drawing
from a recent article by Daniel Shaviro, see Daniel Shaviro , Beyond Public Choice and
Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative Process as Jlluslrated by Tax Legislation in the
1980s , 13 9 U . PA. L. REV. 1, 60-61 (1990), Adler arg ues that American voters a re
willing to deny deductibility to dividends but grant it to interest o n debt becau se they
associate dividends with the wealthy, wherea s interest expense is a cost with which they
themselves a re familiar.
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This analysis is problematic in two related respects. First, it is not
at all clear that contingent/chameleon equity would in fact be denied debt
status. In giving the Treasury authority to define precisely when a
security is or is not debt under § 385 of the Internal Revenue Code,
Congress suggested that the Treasury take several factors into
consideration, including 1) the existence of a written, unconditional
promise to pay on a reasonable certain date, at a fixed rate of interest; 2)
whether the security is subordinated or preferred; 3) the ratio of debt to
equity; 4) convertibility; and 5) the relationship between investors'
holdings of stock and of the securities in question. As the catalogue
suggests, no single factor is dispositive in determining whether a given
security constitutes debt. 125 In this environment, contingent/chameleon
equity seems very likely to qualify for the interest deduction, especially
given the facts that conversion occurs only on default and that the
securities are not designed for tax avoidance purposes. 126 Second, even
if the securities failed to qualify as debt, a much simpler proposition than
eliminating corporate level taxation or the interest deduction would be for
Congress to amend the tax code's definition of debt to explicitly include
fixed claims against a contingent/chameleon equity firm. 127
To appreciate why legislators might adopt such a measure, consider
the following story.
Assume that institutional shareholders and
debtholders press Congress to consider replacing bankruptcy with a
contingent/chameleon equity regime, much as they have lobbied for SEC
action and changes at corporations like Sears, Roebuck, and General
Motors. 128 Banks also lobby aggressively in support of the proposals.

125.
BORIS I. BriTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS§ 4.02, at 4-11, 12 & 14 (1987). Interestingly,
although the Treasury issued regulations for § 385 of the Internal Revenue Code, it
subsequently withdrew them. Courts therefore still are left to their own devices in
determining whether a security qualifies as debt.
126.
See, e.g., BriTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 125, § 4.03, at 15-20. The
leading academic commentary on this issue, although dated in some of its details, is a
massive work by William T. Plumb, Jr., The Federal Income Tax Significance of
Corporate Debt: A Critical Analysis and a Proposal, 26 TAX L. REV. 369 (1971).
127.
Another of the barriers cited by Adler relates to the current treatment of tort
claimants . Adler suggests that, because adoption of the proposal would effectively
subordinate holders of contingenUchameleon equity to tort claimanL~, since tort claimants
currently are deemed to be unsecured creditors, shareholders might be hesitant to support
contingent/chameleon equity. Adler, Financial and Political Th eories, supra note 32, at
339-40. This problem would also disappear if contingenUchamelcon equity were afforded
debt status. Moreover, as Adler acknowledges in the final version of his article, even if
subordination of this sort were unavoidable , shareholders still might not be chilled, since
the likelihood of massive tort liability for most firms is relatively small. Jd. at 340.
128.
See, e.g., Francine Schwadel, Sears Roebuck Sellles Lawsuit over Directors,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 1991, at A9B (agreement by Sears to make " substantial
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Each of these interest groups insists that reform is the onl y way to ensure
that the managers of a giant corporation are adequately penalized for
financial failure, and to eliminate lawyers' outrageous fees m
bankruptcy. 129
Managers and the bankruptcy bar are well organized and have more
at stake tl)an any other group, and they would strongly counter this
pressure. Their familiarity with the legislators and their presence even on
drafting committees would make them a formidable influence. Yet
Congress could hardly afford to ignore the widespread antipathy toward
managers and lawyers .
One solution might be for legislators to adopt the reform, but to give
firms the choice whether to use contingent/chameleon equity or to stay
with the current regime, 130 and to preserve the interest deduction for
firms that invoked the contingent/chameleon equity option. This would
enable Congress to extract rents from each of the relevant interest groups,
without completely alienating any one. Moreover, as Fred McChesney
has pointed out, organization is not an unequivocal advantage. While
effective organization vastly enhances the influence of groups such as
managers and attorneys, it also increases the ease with which rents can be
extracted from them. 131 From this perspective, Congress's interest in
collecting future rents might give it a particularly strong incentive to
destabilize the status of managers and bankruptcy attorneys as described
above .
This story is obviously just that, a story . It is at least plausible that
managers and the corporate and bankruptcy bars are sufficiently powerful,
and would be sufficiently creative in packaging their appeal to
Congress , 132 to thwart any proposed change. What becomes clear as

improvements" in corporate governance in settlement o f suit challenging its treatment of
Robert Monks's dissident campaign for a seat on the bo ard) .
See , e.g. , GORDON TULLOCK , THE ECONOMICS OF SPECIA L PRIVILEGE AND
129.
RENT SEEKING 23 (1 989) ("[American voters] are apt to vote, if th e matter is bro ught to
their attention, in terms o f ideology . It is important that the meas ure b e packaged in s uch
a way that it appears to them to be so mehow in acco rd with their ideo logy.").
130 .
Notice that many state anti takeo ver provisions adopt an analogo us "opt in "
or "opt out " approach . See 15 PA . CONS. STAT. § 2571 (1990). If co ntingent/chameleo n
equity actually improved on Chapter 11, market forces might press ure firms to use it , j ust
as similar pressures ca used many corpo rations to opt out of the Penn sylvania anti takeo ver
provision. See, e.g. , Barbara Demick , Study Links Loss by Pennsylvania Stocks to the
Takeover Law, PHILA . lNQ., Oct. 12 , 1990 , at 1D (mo re than 80 firm s opted o ut o f so me
o r all o f th e protections). As the fo llowing section makes clea r , however, su ch a scenario
would be unlikely with contingent/chameleon equity , given the prob lem s with the
pro posal.
13 1.
McChes ney , supra note 123, at 88 .
!32.
For instance, management might raise a rgum ents o f the so rt d iscussed in the
following section, in an effo rt to fe nd o ff re form . Suc h a rgum ents wo uld probabl y p rove
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public choict- analysis is fleshed out, however , is that thi s assertion is
at best a deb atable one. If none of the proposal s is politically viable , it
may therefore be for very different reasons.

B. The Myth of a Self-Regulating Insolvency Procedure
In his recent article on the Delaware Supreme Court's watershed
corporate law decision in Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Tzme
Inc., 133 Jeffrey Gordon concludes that a "socio-h is tori cal" account better
explains the court's actions than either the standard or a more
sophisticated version of public choice analysis. 134 In this section, I use
a variant of this analysis to demonstrate what ultimately is the fatal flaw
with the proposed alternatives to Chapter 11, and why none is likely to
be enacted.
Gordon derives his socio-historical thesis from The Great
Transformation, 135 Karl Polanyi's historically-based analysis of the
relationship between market economies and government intervention. 136
Polanyi contends that a market economy cannot exist apart from
regulation. Regulation is necessary both to establish the market and,
more importantly for present purposes, to prevent it from spiralling out
of control, from causing catastrophic dislocations in society, as it would
were it permitted to become truly self-regulating. 137 Gordon argues that
the corporate takeover market of the 1980s began to assume many of the
characteristics of a self-regulating market. The magnitude and abruptness
of the changes in corporate control created a widespread perception that
the market had lost its moorings and had begun to reward the pursuit of
individual gain at the expense of less easily quantifiable societal values

powerful, yet the ir effectiveness stems not so much from managerial skill at deluding the
public, cf TuLLOCK, supra note 129, at 23; Shaviro, supra note 124, at 57-64 (describing
systematic cognitive misperccptions by taxpayers), as from critical shortcomings in the
proposal itself.
133 .
571 A .2d 1140 (Del. 1989) .
134.
Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations, Markets , and Courts, 91 COLUM . L. REV.
1931 (1991) .
POLA.NYI, supra note 9.
135 .
Polanyi focuses on the development o f a market economy in connectio n with
136.
the Industrial Revolution of the 19th Century as a means of trying to expla in the events
that led to the rise o f fascism a fter World War I and immed iately prior to World War II .
According to Polanyi, the market eco nomy did not develop naturally, as laissez faire
economists have contended . Rather , it depended upo n the commoditization o f land, labo r
and capital, and created an irreso lvable tension between the market and human rights.
Polanyi argues that the resul ta nt deadlock facilita ted the emergence of fasci sm . !d.
!d. at 141.
137.
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such as loyalty, continuity, and community. m Fro m this perspective,
the court's decision in Paramount, which gives the directors of a target
corporation broad authority to reject a hostile takeover bid, can be seen
as the kind of regulatory response the Polanyi thesis would predict.
Interposing the human agency of the target directors was the court's way
of restraining some of the excesses of fu'l entirely market-driven regime.
Gordon's application of the Polanyi thesis sheds important light on
Congress's likely response to the proposed alternatives to Chapter 11.
Each of the alternatives would implement a market-based, self-regulating
insolvency regime in place of the current judicially-oriented Bankruptcy
Code. The preplanned adjustment, contingent/chameleon equity, and
elimination of bankruptcy proposals attempt to obviate the need for court
or other judicial involvement altogether. 139 (I will refer to these as the
pure market proposals). The mandatory auction proposal retains a role
for the court, which would arbitrate the parties' entitlement disputes, but
depends upon the very same market dynamic, the corporate takeover, that
Paramount arguably calls into question.
Seen in this light, the proposals seem particularly precarious from a
political perspective. Given the pervasive concern about the consequences
of a self-regulating system of corporate law outside of bankruptcy, one
suspects that Congress would reject any system that appears simply to
transplant these perceived corporate law excesses, with their threat of job
loss and business shutdown, into the bankruptcy domain. 140
The
assumption in American bankruptcy law at least since the enactment of the
Chandler Act in 1938 that state involvement in the person of a bankruptcy
judge is needed to facilitate and protect the reorganization process
strongly reinforces this suspicion. More regulation, rather than less, may
well be the order of the day. 141

138 .
Gordon, supra note 134, at 1972.
139.
Bradley and Rosenzweig make this aspiration explicit: ~ An important feature
o f our proposal, distinct from others, is that it completely avoids judicial intervention."
Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 4 , at 1085 (emphasis in the origina l).
140.
Whether the concerns about the takeover market may be overs tated , or even
wholly inaccurate, is a matter o f much dispute. The important po int for present pu rposes
is that many po liticians and a broad segment of th e p ublic perceive the escalation of
takeove r activity to have been a dangerous and disruptive phenomenon.
141.
In theory , the analysis cou ld also be interpreted to predict that Congress
perhaps will enact one of the propo sals, but, were this to happe n, courts or Congress itself
would subsequently act to reign in the self-regu lating market the proposal had created.
The most obvious way to reign in th e proposa ls would be for cou rts to limit their
operation, as fo r instance by granting shareho lders ' suil~ to enjoin the actual cancellation
of equity following an appa rent de fault. While this hypothetica l chain of events arguably
fi ts the Polanyi thesis more closely than the analysis in the text, o ne suspects that
Congress would simply reject the proposals in the first instance.
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One could argue that the concerns underiying this conclusion are
misguided and, ironically, are most unwarranted with respect to a fully
self-regulating regime such as contingent/chameleon equity. Stockholders
would lose their interests were a contingent/chameleon firm to default,
and unsecured creditors become stockholders, but an otherwise viable
finn could continue operating with a pared down financial structure,
almost without breaking stride. By contrast, Chapter 11 is costly, time
consuming, and contentious. Thus, the argument might conclude,
adoption of a pure market proposal, and removal of judicial intervention,
could prove both more efficient and less disruptive to intangible social
values than Chapter 11.
Unfortunately, the defense conceals a pair of related flaws, which
erase the nonnative appeal of the proposals and further call into question
their prospects for being enacted. First, as Polanyi pointed out with
respect to the transition to a market economy generally, the promise of
a truly self-regulating insolvency system is illusory . 142 Consider the
contingent/chameleon equity proposal once again. If a contingent/
chameleon firm defaulted, its shareholders would not simply stand idly by
as their equity was cancelled and their shareholder status shifted upward
within the firm. On the contrary, they would frequently embroil the firm
in suits as to whether a default had actually occurred, for instance, or
whether creditors had waived their rights. 143 The effect of such suits
would be to bring the state right back into the picture.
The other flaw is more pervasive. The pure market proposals
assume that, since market players can be expected to make better assetdeployment decisions than a court would, the optimal insolvency regime
is one that removes the judicial apparatus altogether. This reasoning
ignores the fact that, despite being poorly positioned to make most
business decisions, 144 courts still have a crucial role to play in an
insolvency proceeding. Courts are well equipped to detect strategic
behavior, and the current Bankruptcy Code is replete with provisions that
put the court in this role. Some, such as the preference provisions,
involve relatively little judicial discretion; 145 other sections, such as

142.
POU\NYI, supra note 9, at 141.
143.
See, e.g., LoPucki, supra note 5, at 104-05.
144.
See, e.g., Skeel, supra note 18, at 497 (arguing that courts should not make
business decisions such as the decision whether to approve preconfmnation sales of most
or all of a finn's assets in bankruptcy); Kenneth E. Scott, Corporation Law and The
American Law Jnsrirule Corporate Governance Project, 35 STAN . L. REv. 927, 946
(1983) (arguing that courts are better able to police for duty of loyalty violations than for
violations of the duty of care).
145.
Bankruptcy Code§ 547.
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those dealing with
fraudulent
conveyances 14{)
and
equitable
147
subordination,
require the court to make extremely subjective
judgments as to whether a party has acted opportunistically.
To be sure, the parties could invoke a variety of analogous
nonbankruptcy statutory and common law rules as a means of policing
strategic behavior even in a pure market insolvency regime. But the
panoply of nonbankruptcy causes of action would fall well short of
bankruptcy in three different respects. First, nonbankruptcy rules address
only a limited range of the strategic behavior that occurs in the insolvency
context. Fraudulent conveyance and related nonbankruptcy laws prohibit
a debtor from entering into sham transactions whose effect is to transfer
assets out of the estate, for instance, but are much less effective in
curbing a debtor's ability strategically to favor certain legitimate creditors.
Bankruptcy's more complete response to strategic behavior could be
replicated, of course, outside of bankruptcy. For example, courts might
use equitable subordination principles to address preinsolvency favoritism
and Congress or the states could adopt preference provisions tailored to
the new pure market insolvency regime. 148 But each of these responses
presumes and necessitates a general, insolvency-triggered reassessment of
the parties' respective entitlements-precisely what the pure market
theories purport not to need.
Second, in the absence of bankruptcy, a party might bring a suit
alleging that another creditor received a fraudulent conveyance in one
jurisdiction, while a lender liability claim was filed in an entirely different
forum. At the least, they will be largely disconnected cases, despite their
common nexus in a financially troubled debtor. Consolidating these suits
in a single court, before a single judge, offers significant judicial

146.
!d. § 548. Compare Mellon Bank, N .A . v. Metro Communications, Inc., 945
F.2d 635 (3d Cir. 1991) (reversing finding that bank's financing of a leveraged buyout
constituted a fraudulent conveyance) with Crowthers McCall Pattern, Inc. v. Lewis, 129
B.R. 992 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (denying lender's motion to dismi~s fraudulent conveyance
action).
147 .
Bankruptcy Code § 510(c) . See, e.g., Unsecured Creditors' Comm. of
Heartland Chern., Inc. v. Banque Paribas (In re Heartland Chemicals, Inc .) , 136 B.R. 503
(C. D. Ill. 1992) (bank's actions in pursuing prepetition remedies did not warrant equitable
subordination) .
148.
Adler suggests that the parties could also devise contractual responses to
eliminate the possibility of strategic behavior. Adler, Financial and Political Theories,
supra note 32, at 330. One problem with this approach is that the parties' attempts to
anticipate and address every potential defalcation would make the contracting process
enormously expensive. Moreover, as the analysis in the text makes clear, private ordering
will inevitably be an inadequate substitute for ex post judicial review in the bankruptcy
context. See, e.g., George M. Cohen, The Negligence-Opportunism Tradeoff in Contract
Law, HOFSTRA L. REV. 94 (forthcoming 1992).
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economies. 149
Moreover, unlike ordinary state or federal judges,
battkruptcy judges are specialists, and have particular familiarity with the
end game maneuvers pa.rties engage in prior to bankruptcy. 1.so
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the progression of a bankruptcy
case gives the parties an opportunity to observe and examine the debtor
(as well as one another). To facilitate this process, the Bankruptcy Code
and rules require the debtor to file various forms of disclosure 151 and
provide dramatically liberalized access to the debtor's officers, employees,
Stated differently, the existence of a collectivized
and files. 152
insolvency proceeding acts as an information forcing device which enables
the parties to detect misbehavior that otherwise might have gone
unnoticed, thus further reducing both the likelihood and efficacy of
strategic behavior.
The process also gives every constituency an
opportunity to watch the firm during its transition period, and thus to
reassess their relationship wit.lJ the debtor; and it establishes a reckoning
point against which future performance can be measured. 153

149.
This conclusion should not be taken to imply that the parties must prosecute
all litigation involving the debtor, of whatever nature, in the bankruptcy court. Robert
Rasmussen has argued persuasively that bankruptcy courts should defer to the expertise
of administrative agencies with respect to certain kinds of administrative proceedings.
Robert K. Rasmussen, Bankruptcy and the Administrative State, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1567
(1991).
150.
The argument in the text is analogous to commentators' frequent citation of
the corporate law expertise of Delaware's chancery court as .one of the reasons for
Delaware's continued success in attracting corporate charters. Macey & Miller, supra
note 111, at 488-89 .
151.
Chapter 11 debtors are required to provide extensive , ongoing disclosure in
accordance with standards the district in question has adopted under Bankruptcy Rule
9029 . For other disclosure requirements, see Bankruptcy Code § 704(8) (requiring
periodic reports in Chapter 7 cases); id. § 521 (requiring debtor to file a "schedule of
assets and liabilities, a schedule of current income and current expenditures, and a
statement of the debtor's financial affairs"); id. § 1125 (requiring plan proponent to file
disclosure statement in connection with a proposed reorganization plan) .
152.
Bankruptcy Rule 2004. Rule 2004 has been interpreted to authorize
significantly greater access to discovery than that afforded by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See, e.g., In re GHR Energy Corp., 33 B.R. 451, 453 (D. Mass. 1983)
(examination may be "exploratory and groping").
153.
An analogy can be drawn between Chapter 11 and the role of the appraisal
remedy in state corporate law. The appraisal remedy has traditionally been seen as a
means of insuring that shareholders who disapprove of a fundamental change and who do
not wish to continue with the corporation will be bought out at a fair price. See Hideki
Kanda & Saul Levmore, Tfle Appraisal Remedy and the Goals of Corporate Law, 32
UCLA L. REV. 429, 430-31 (1985) (discussing the traditional view and the sustained
criticism it has received). Kanda and Lcvmore have argued that the appraisal remedy may
in reality serve somewhat different purposes . In their view, some state appraisal statutes
perform a ~reck o nin g " function, and others help shareholders uncover opportunistic
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In short, in their single-minded focus on introducing market
efficiency into the insolvency process, the pure market proposals greatly
underestimate the threat of prebankruptcy strategic behavior and
bankruptcy's effectiveness as a policing mechanism. It is particularly
ironic that, as discussed earlier, the proposals actually increase the
likelihood of costly strategic behavior, 154 even as they undermine the
parties' ability to detect, penalize, and therefore restrain it. 155
Recognition of the role of the bankruptcy court and of the collective
proceeding provided by Chapter 11 raises a final question: Must these
functions necessarily be state-sponsored?
In theory, the parties
themselves could develop an analogous proceeding contractually . 156 The
parties might appoint an arbitrator, for instance, who would perform the
monitoring role currently handled by a bankruptcy judge. 157 The parties
could give the arbitrator authority to require and oversee discovery , both
for detecting strategic behavior and to assess the prospects of the firm.
The parties would lose the subsidy provided by a state-sponsored
proceeding if they were to replicate its benefits contractually, but they
would also avoid the costs of its current inefficiencies .
Unfortunately, use of a contractual arbitration proceeding ultimately
seems untenable for at least two reasons. The first stems from the
difficulty of establishing an effective framework.
In addition to
appointing an arbitrator, the parties would need to provide for a means of
representing diverse and scattered claimants-in short, to replicate in
some fashion Chapter 11 's committee framework. Moreover, unlike a
court, the arbitrator could not resolve either claims involving

behavio r by the firm's managers. /d. at 441-44 . Bankruptcy arguably does each o f these
things in a much less awkward (although expensive) fas hion .
See supra notes 63-69, 94-96 and accompanying text.
154.
The analysis in the text suggests that, as a minimum, any alternative to
155.
Chapter 11 should provide for a comparab le postinsolvency co llective proceeding. See,
e.g . , John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay
on the Judicia l Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618 (1 989) (a rguing that parties should be
permitted to bargain with respect to fiduciary duties, but not below a ma ndatory minimum
standard o f good faith) . Notice that this would impose an important limitation on each
of the choices in Rasmussen's "menu" approach.
156.
As a practical matter, the difficulty of binding both present an d future parties
creates a serious impediment to devising such a scheme. For example, U.C.C. § 9-201
makes clear that if the debtor failed to include the arrangement in a contract with one of
its sec ured creditors, such a creditor would not be bound. For th e purposes o f the
discussion that foll ows, I put this problem to one side.
The dra fters of the UCC are currently co nside rin g amending Article 2 to
157 .
provide for mandatory arbitration in some contexts. See Letter from Paul Barron to
David Skeel (July 13, 1992) (on file with author). While a rbitration is more attractive in
a two-pa rty co ntext than in one involving multiple parties, the proposal suffers fro m some
of the de fects di scussed in the text below.

1993:465

Brave New World of Bankruptcy Theory

509

nonconsensua! creditors, such as tort claimants, or pension claims and
other nonbankruptcy issues. These limitations would severely constrain
her effectiveness.
Even if the parties somehow surmounted their organizational
difficulties, however, a state-sponsored system stili would be superior.
Unlike the contractual alternative, a state-sponsored system offers benefits
not only for the case at hand, but also for future parties.
The
development of a rich body of precedent lowers dispute and litigation
costs significantly by reducing uncertainty as to likely outcomes. 158 To
be sure, the arbitrator inevitably would rely on existing precedent in
making her determinations. But if a significant percentage of firms
decided to create their own collective proceeding by contract, the
precedent base would quickly begin to erode. 159 As a result, other
things being equal, a state regime will always be preferable to its
contractual counterpart.

C. Concluding Thoughts
Each of the proposed alternatives to Chapter 11 picks up on the need
for a more market-based decision-making apparatus in Chapter 11. As
I myself have argued, the current Bankruptcy Code too often vests
decision-making authority, even with respect to what ultimately are
business decisions, in the hands of the bankruptcy judge. 1w A better
regime would shift authority in these contexts away from the court and
back toward the marketplace. As our application of the Polanyi thesis has
suggested, however, removing the court from the role of business
decision maker does not mean that the court can or should be eliminated
entirely. Both the court and the existence of a state-sponsored collective
proceeding play a crucial role in the insolvency process. Coupled with
their other shortcomings, the insistence of the new proposals on imposing
a self-regulating market procedure makes each an inadequate substitute for
the current regime.

158 .
See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Preced ent: A Th eoretical
and Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON . 249 (1976); ROB ERT E. S COTT & DOUGLAS L.
LESLIE, C O NTRACT LAW AND THEORY 8 (1988) .
159.
Erosion of the precedent base was one of the chief arguments aga inst adopting
separate rules for close corporations outside of bankruptcy. See Dennis S. Karjala, A
Second Look at Sp ecial Cwse Corporation Legislation , 58 TEX. L. REV. 1207, 1213-27
(1980); Jan Ayres, Judging Cwse Corporations in the Age ofStaJutes , 70 WA SH. U. L.Q.
365, 373 (1992) .
160.
Skeel, supra note 18, at 497-500 (unsecured creditors rather than the court
should approve or disapprove preconfirmation sales of substantial assets).
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IV .

WHAT

CAJ"·l

BE DONE WITH THE BANKRUPTCY

CoDE?

The analysis of the preceding parts has suggested at least two crucial
lessons for ban.l<JUptcy reform. First, both the proposed alternatives to
Chapter 11 and Chapter 11 itself fail adequately to distinguish among
close and publicly held corporations. A superior regime must function
effectively in each, rather than only in one or the other, of these contexts.
Second, reform must be particularly sensitive to the appropriate domains
of market and of judicial decision making.
My aim in this part is to show that the drafters could better
accomodate both of these goals if they scrapped the "one size fits all"
approach of current Chapter 11 in favor of separate chapters for close and
nonclosely held corporations. The move toward separate chapters with
what I will refer to as more "context specific" rules would make it
significantly easier to give decision making authority over business issues
to private decision makers (i.e., the parties themselves), rather than to a
court, while retaining judicial involvement with respect to those issues
that courts are particularly well equipped to decide.
The proposal to establish a two corporation system has a familiar
ring in the insolvency context: Both Chapters X and XI of the old
Bankruptcy Act, and bankruptcy legislation recently considered by
Congress distinguish between closely held and public corporations. After
explaining the potential benefits of separate chapters, I conclude the part
by examining both the unsuccessful Act regime and the proposed
bankruptcy legislation in light of the very different two corporation
system I would propose.

A. Different Rules for Different Debtors: The Need for
Separate Closely Held and Nonclosely Held Corporation Chapters
Corporate law commentators first called for special treatment of close
corporations in states' corporation law statutes more than sixty years
ago. 161
The argument was simple:
Because of their unique
characteristics, close corporations are ill served by a general statute that
treats all corporations as essentially equivalent. States and the drafters of
the model codes have responded by enacting special provisions addressing
particular close corporation issues. 162

161.
See, e.g., Joseph L. Weiner, Legislative Recognition of the Close
Corporation, 27 MICH. L. R EV. 273 (1929).
162.
More than 20 states c urrently have special provisions of one form o r another
for close corporations. 1 F. HODG E O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON , O'N EAL 'S CLOSE
CoRPORATIONS§ 1.15, at 76 (3d ed. 1987).
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Although both close aild pubiicly held firms may one day file for
bankruptcy, the Bankruptcy Code does not carry forward the corporation
law policy of distinguishing between u'1em.
As a result, and as
commentators have long noted, a significant number of Bankruptcy Code
provisions are particularly ill suited for certain kinds of debtors. A brief
discussion of two pressing issues, one relating to close corporation
debtors and one to publicly held firms, should begin to iliustrate the need
for a more context-specific insolvency regime.
First, the close corporation context. Lynn LoPucki has shown that,
despite the Code's requirement that an unsecured creditors' committee
comprising seven of the debtor's largest unsecured creditors be appointed
in every case, 163 courts routinely fail to appoint such committees in
bankruptcies involving closely held debtors. 164 This failure probably
reflects the lack of a sufficient incentive for unsecured creditors to
participate, since their ciaims may be relatively small and most or all of
any distribution usually goes to the firm's secured lender. 165 The
problem is that in those cases where recovery is or would be likely,
unsecured creditors may lose out because they are not represented at the
bargaining table.
A regime that distinguished between close and publicly held
corporations could easily address this breakdown of the committee
structure. Rather than require a court to find seven willing committee
members, the close corporation provision could authorize the court to
appoint a single large unsecured creditor to act as the representative for
the class. This creditor would have all the rights currently afforded to a
committee, and would owe the same fiduciary duty to its constituency.
Such a rule not only would ensure greater protection for unsecured
creditors in cases where recovery is likely, 166 but it also would

163.
Bankruptcy Code§ 1102 .
164.
Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control-Systems Failure Under
Chapter 11 ofthe Bankruptcy Code?, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J . 247 (1983).
Bowers, Murphy's Law, supra note 21, at 2098 n.2 ; DAVID T. STANLEY &
165.
M . GiRTH, BANKRUPTCY PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM 88, 127, 130 (1971) (general
unsecured creditors o f corpo rate debtors receive an average of only 8% of their claims).
Bowers suggests that unsecured creditors' low recoveries are due to the likelihood that
debtors have taken significant actions to distribute their losses prior to bankruptcy-that
is, they have so ld assets and paid various creditors. In reality, it seems more likely that
the vast majority of clo sely held debtors' assets are tied up in a secu red loan even in more
prosperous times and that financial difficulties simply exaggerate this situation. Stated
differently, gene ral cred itors depend upon current payment, not payment in bankruptcy,
and bankruptcy results do not disappoint this expectation.
166.
The question ari ses as to whether even a single c red ito r co mmittee is
ap propriate in cases where unsecu red creditors' interests are completely und er water. Th e
answer would appear to be affirmative fo r two rea so ns . First , the single creditor would
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significantly lower the committee's costs.
Context specific rules also might greatl y improve th.e reorganization
of publicly held debtors. I have argued at length elsewhere that
unsecured creditors should be given voting authority over the choice of
a debtor's directors (in the event that ar1 election is held in Chapter 11)
and also with respect to the decision whether to approve a proposed
preconfirmation sale of most or all of u1e firm's assets. 167 As the new
residual owners of an insolvent firm, unsecured creditors could be
expected to make better directorial decisions than shareholders, who are
the current voters. 168 Their financial stake also gives them decisionmaking incentives superior to those of courts, which currently make what
is in effect a business judgment in deciding whether to approve asset
sales. 169 These voting proposals make sense only for Chapter 11 cases
involving publicly held firms, but, in that context, both would markedly
improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the decision-making
process. 170
The problems with bankruptcy's current undifferentiated rules stem
largely from the classic differences between close and publicly held
corporations. Publicly held corporations are characterized by a separation
of ownership and control, with professional managers running the
corporation and widely scattered shareholders as its nominal owners. 171
By contrast, closely held corporations frequently have a small number of
shareholders, most or all of whom also participate in the management of
the firm. The shares of a closely held firm are not traded on a public
exchange and are frequently subject to restrictions on transfer. m
How should the Bankruptcy Code be reformed to better reflect these
differences? One approach would be to employ the American Law

presumably participate less actively in a case where unsecured credito rs are not likely to
recover anything. Second, and more importantly , if unsecured creditors' interests are
clearly under water, a better solution would be to gran t the secured creditor relief from
the automatic stay, and to allow the secured credito r to determine how best to make use
of the assets of the firm .
167.
Skeel, supra note 18.
!d. at 505-13 .
168 .
169 .
!d. at 495-501.
170.
Unsecured creditor voting on directors is less attractive in the context of
closely held firms, because jeopardizing the debtor' s role as director or owner is likely
to mean the end of the corporation in its current form. The problem with unsecured
creditors voting on prcconf1rmation sales of assets is that unsecured creditors often are not
the optimal decision makers with respect to a closely held Chapter 11 debtor. Because
many closely held debtors are fully encumbered and their secured creditor
underco Uateralized, secured creditors may frequently be the residual class in this co ntext.
See, e.g., Skeel, supra note 18, at 497 n.134.
171.
See, e.g., ROBERT C . CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 359-60 (1986).
/d. at 24-28.
172.
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Institute's strategy outside of bankruptcy-a strategy shared by a number
of states-of adding "close corporation" and "publicly held corporation"
to the definitional section of the Code, and then referencing these
definitions in provisions that apply to a specific kind of corporate
Such an approach would prove unsatisfactory in the
debtor. m
bankruptcy context, however. Because the provisions of Chapter 11
comprise an elaborate corporate governance framework, many of whose
sections function differently for different kinds of corporations, the
cha...YJges needed are too extensive to be addressed in piecemeal fashion.
Rather than following the ALI approach, then, the drafters should
establish entirely separate chapters for closely held and nonclosely held
debtors. 174 As the discussion above indicates, the close corporation
chapter should alter the current committee structure to provide for a
single creditor agency arrangement, whereas nonclosely held corporations
might continue to use the extant rules for committee formation.
Similarly, the proposals for unsecured creditor voting on directors and
preconfirmation sales should be adopted in the nonclosely held
corporation chapter, but not for close! y held firms.
The drafters also could address problems with respect to two other
important aspects of corporate reorganization in connection with the move
to a two chapter system. Both reforms would pressure the parties to
reorganize more quickly and, as a result, would decrease both the direct
costs-lawyers and other professionals charge less in a twelve month case
than in a two year case-and the indirect costs of bankruptcy.
The first deals with the debtor's agenda control over the
reorganization process. Under the Bankruptcy Code in its current form,

173.
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT, Part I (Mar. 31, 1992) [hereinafter ALI, PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE]_ The ALl defines a debtor with a smaU number of
shareholders and for which no active trading market existed prior to bankruptcy as a
"close corporation debtor." The existence of 500 or more shareholders and at least $5
million in total assets meets the sl2.ndard for being publicly held. !d. § 1.31. The ALI
definition of publicly held corporations is derived from various sources, including
Secu rities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(g) and Rule 12g-1 , and Federal Securities Code §
402a. The ALI also has specific definitions for "Large Publicly Held Corporation," ALI,
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra, § 1.24, and "Small Publicly Held
Corporation." !d. § 1 _35 _
174_
The distinction between close and publicly held corporations leaves o ut a
la rge class of finn s th at fall between these two extremes. Because closely held firm s
differ far more from either publicly held corporations or this intermediate class of firm s
than the other two types of firms differ from one another, closely held finns sho uld have
an entirely sepa rate chapter. The other chapter would comprise all corpo rations that do
not fit this definition and thu s are "nonclosely" held. A more precise breakdown might
make furthe r distinctions amo ng nonclosely held firm s (as the ALI does), b ut the benefits
of the added precision do not seem significant enough to warrant such a step.
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the debtor in possession alone has the right to propose a reorganization
plan for the first 120 days of a bankruptcy case. 175
This initial
exclusivity period is not itself a problem-the rule focuses tl-)e parties'
efforts and vests authority in the only party that is fully familiar with all
aspects of the firm. 176
But courts routineiy extend exclusivity,
particularly in cases involving publicly held firms. 177 Unfortunately,
these extensions give the debtor an indefinite stranglehold over the plan
process in many cases, and exacerbate the incentives a debtor already has
to slow the reorganization process.m
The problem could be
substa..r1tially reduced if the drafters were to impose a fixed limit on the
length of the debtor's exclusivity period. Increasing the exclusivity period
to 180 days, but prohibiting extensions, for instance, would afford a
nonclosely held debtor sufficient breathing space and at the same time
increase the pressure to develop a plan quickly. Because the negotiations
involving closely held firms are frequently less complex, the drafters
could adopt a shorter, but equally fixed, exclusivity period such as ninety
days for closely held firms. 179
Given courts' frequent effectiveness in policing opportunistic
behavior, one might wonder why the drafters need to propose a legislative
solution to the exclusivity issue; that is, why do courts themselves not
impose appropriate limits? The problem apparently is that courts are
largely unable to credibly commit to terminating exclusivity at the end of

175.
Bankruptcy Code § 1121.
176.
Bradley Johnston has pointed out another advantage of exclusivity: It ensures
the existence, at least initially, of a "single negotiating text.~ J. Bradley Johnston, The
Bankruptcy Bargain, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 213, 270 (1991). Starting with a single plan
rather than several conflicting proposals simplifies and coordinates the bargaining process.
HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 211 (1982) (single
negotiating text used in the negotiations between Begin and Sad at to focus the parties'
attention on a single document).
177.
LoPucki & Whitford, Bargaining over Equity's Share, supra note 10, at 28.
178.
Note that these incentives arc particularly problematic when the managers are
aligned with shareholders, since they will want to prolong the case and take risks so as
to increase the likelihood shareholders will end up with something. See, e.g., Jackson &
Scott, supra note 19, at 170.
179.
After this article was written, the House passed bankruptcy legislation that
would have limited exclusivity to one year (and also deleted a proposed new chapter that
included a ninety day limitation for close corporations). H.R. 6020, 102d Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 102 (1992). While I prefer a 180 day limitation (and also have some reservations about
the proposal's escape hatch, which would have permitted extensions if "the need for such
an increase is attributable to circumstances for which the debtor should not justly be held
accountable"), the one year limit would have improved upon current law had the
legislation not eventually died. I discuss the legislation in more detail, infra Section IV. 8.
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the current 120--day period. 180 Tne debtor, as weli as the other parties,
knows that the court will extend exclusivity if the parties have made
progress toward a confirmable reorganization plan; the debtor therefore
has little incentive to hasten the reorganization process.
While a
bankruptcy judge could announce at the beginning of a case ti1at she does
not intend to extend exclusivity, the debtor has little reason to believe that
she will not change her mind if, at the end of the initial period, the parties
appear to need just a week or two more to conclude their
negotiations. 181 Legislative commitment to a fixed exclusivity period
eliminates these problems by making a court's threat fully credible.
Second, the drafters could adjust the confirmation requirements of
the nonclosely held corporation chapter to curb the hold up power
currently wielded in that context by the shareholders of a Chapter 11
debtor. Under the current Bankruptcy Code, the parties have a strong
incentive to pass a consensual reorganization plan, despite the facts that
consensual reorganization requires voting approval of every class of
claims or interests and, further, that the Code provides for confirmation
of a nonconsensual, "crarndown" plan. 182 Consequently, even though
shareholders theoretically have little or no financial interest in an
insolvent firm, the plan proponent must secure their approval in order to
confirm a consensual plan. Shareholders frequently use the veto power
that the process gives them to delay the case. 183 To address this

180.
The problem is exacerbated by bankruptcy judges' desire to encourage high
profile debtors to file for bankruptcy in their courthouse. Lynn M. LoPucki & William
C. Whitford, Venue Choice and Forum Shopping in the Ban/..:ruptcy Reorganization of
Large, Publicly Held Companies, 1991 WIS. L. REV 11, 13.
181.
Courts' inability to make a credible commitment or threat in this context
stems from their lack of a direct stake in the outcome of the case. Because they lack a
direct interest, courts cannot easily provide a "hostage" or otherwise commit themselves
to a particular course of action.
See generally Oliver E. Williamson, Credible
Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73 AM. EcoN . REV. 519 (1983).
182.
Bankruptcy Code§ 1129(a)(8) requires, for a consensual plan, that each class
that is impaired vote in favor of the plan. The requirements for a nonconsensual plan, the
most important of which is the absolute priority rule, are set forth in Bankruptcy Code§
1129(b). Due to the expense and uncertainty of the valuation required under Bankruptcy
Code § 1129(b ), both the parties and courts are strongly predisposed toward consensual
reorganization . LoPucki and Whitford argue that the attorneys' status as repeat players
who will encounter one another again in future Chapter 11 cases is also a crucial element
in this calculus. LoPucki & Whitford, Bargaining over Equity's Share, supra note 10 ,
at 143-58.
183.
Strategic behavior of this sort appears to have played a key role in the
collapse of an auction in the bankruptcy of Allegheny International. Donaldson, Lufkin
& Jenrette Securities twice seemed to have won the auction, but the debtor reopened the
bidding on both occasions after heavy pressure from the firm's shareholders to consider
new offers by the other bidder, Paul Levy. The Paul Levy bid s did not appear to offe r
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problern, the drafters should amend § 1129, the confirmation provi sio n,
to provide in the nonclosely held firm context that, if a plan is approved
by every class except the firm's shareholders, the court must approve the
plan if the firm appears to be insolvent as of the time of the vote. This
partial crarndown, a variation of LoPucki and Whitford's recent
"preemptive cramdown" proposal, would significantly reduce the duration
of cases in which shareholder opportunism is the primary impediment to
timely reorganization. 1&4
While partial cramdown theoreticaliy is
possible under the current Bankruptcy Code, adopting it explicitly would
effectively counter the parties' current reluctance to utilize this alternative
to consensual reorganization.
As with unsecured creditor voting on directors and preconfirmation
sales, partial cramdown is less attractive for closely held firms, whose
shareholders and managers are the same people. If the corporation is
deeply insolvent, it may make more sense for the court to grant relief
from the automatic stay for the primary lender. 185 On the other hand,
for those close corporation cases where reorganization is at least
plausible, the drafters could consider adopting a variation of the new
value exception to the absolute priority rule, which permits shareholders
to retain an interest in the reorganized company over the objections of
creditors, even if the creditors will not be paid in ful1. 186 While the
exception is entirely inappropriate for nonclosely held firms (and is rarely
used in that context), a case can be made for its inclusion in modified
form in a chapter limited to closely held debtors. 187

superior value; rather, their salient characteristic was that they proposed a particularly
generous treatment of shareholders. The value of the firm fell precipitously after the
See, e.g., Clare Ansberry, Takeover Mayhem: When Will
auction co llapsed .
Somebody-Anybody-Rescue Battered Allegheny?, WALL ST. 1., Apr. 19, 1990, at Al.
184.
LoPucki & Whitford, Bargaining over Equity's Share, supra note 10, at 186.
LoPucki and Whitford argue that, if the debtor is so clearly insolvent that there is no
possibility shareholders will be entitled to a distribution, courts should make a finding
early in the case effectively excluding shareholders from the case. The problem with this
proposal is that ea rly in the case courts will be excessively optimistic about the possibility
of a recovery for shareholders, rather than risk being proven wrong by subsequent events.
The advantage of the partial cramdown proposal is that it comes at a time in the case
when the debtor's value is much more clear, and the threat of strategic behavior is
particularly acute.
185.
See supra note 166.
186.
David A. Skeel, Jr. , The Uncertain State of an Unstated Rule: Bankruptcy's
Contribution Rule Doctrine After Ahle rs, 63 AM. BANKR. L.J . 221, 223 (1989).
187 .
See Bruce A . Markell, Owners, Auctions, and Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy
R eorganizations , 44 STAN. L. REV. 69 (1991). Markell argues that shareholders should
retain their right to participate in the new value context, but only if the potentia l for abuse
is controlled through several important changes in the reorganization process . In
particular, in order to neutralize the shareholders' procedural adva ntage, Ma rkell

!993:465

Brave New World of Ban!a-uptcy Theory

517

Needless to say, the two reorganization ch apters will overlap in some
respects. Both should retain the assumption that current managers will
continue to operate the business in bankruptcy, for instance. 188 But
more carefully tailoring the bankruptcy process to account for differences
between closely held and publicly held corporations would greatly
improve the process, and change could provide a means of addressing
many of the problems that currently plague Chapter 11, such as
administrative inefficiency and the frequent failure to put decision-making
authority in the hands of the constituency most likely to wield it
effective! y.

B. The Failure Last Ti.me: Chapters X and XI of the
Bankruptcy Act
One potential objection to the proposed shift to a two corporation
regime might suggest, in effect, that the drafters have already tried this
strategy and it did not work. To appreciate the objection, it is necessary
first to consider briefly the structure of the former Bankruptcy Act.
Under the Act, the drafters developed separate chapters for publicly
held corporations and nonpublic firms. Chapter X, the chapter for
publicly held firms, provided for replacement of management by a
trustee, required strict adherence to the absolute priority rule, and was
By
only available to firms whose debts exceeded $3 million. 189
contrast, Chapter XI permitted the firm's managers to stay in charge,
prohibited modification of the firm's secured debt, and did not condition
reorganization on preservation of absolute priority . 1<;()

advocates that the exclusivity period be terminated as soon as an equityholder proposes
a new value plan, that the Bankruptcy Code should not require the proponent of a
competing plan to prove the "reorganization value of the firm, and that a court should
confmn the competing plan (rather than the equityholder's plan) if the parties vote in
favor of both it and the new value plan. !d. at 112-21. Even in this modified form, the
exception would only be attractive if courts were willing to confirm liquidating plans or
grant relief from the stay in the event the debtor is hopelessly insolvent. See generally
Skeel, supra note 186 (criticizing the exception as currently applied).
188.
Bankruptcy Code§ 1107. In the nonclosely held fmn context, immediate
removal of management would create significant indirect costs both before and during
bankruptcy. Prior to bankruptcy, managers would stall as long as possible rather than file
a bankruptcy petition and immediately lose their jobs. During bankruptcy, immediate
replacement of management with a trustee would add to the distractions of the process,
since the trustee would be unable to focus on business affairs until she familiarized herself
with the firm . With respect to close corporations , because the managers are both the
shareholders and an integral part of the identity of the firm, ousting them would all but
eliminate the benefits of bankruptcy for such a debtor.
189.
1973 COM~f! SS ION REPORT , sup ra note 118, at 244-48.
190.
Id.
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The Act scheme proved a colossal failure. The managers of pub! icl y
held firms took advantage of Chapter XI's failure to explicitly exclude
these firms, and filed under Chapter XI so t.I1at they could retain control
of the company and would not be hamstrung by the absolute priority rule .
Pitched, and costly, battles arose as to whether this was a permissible
jurisdictional choice. 191
While the experience with Chapters X and XI illustrates some of t.I1e
risks of a context-specific approach, it ultimately does not undermine the
case for a two corporation system. First, and most obviously, the
proposed reforms outlined above do not suffer from the specific flaws that
doomed the Act regime. The proposal would preserve the current Code's
presumption that the present managers will stay in office for both
chapters, 192 therefore eliminating the considerable forum-shopping
incentives created by a framework that automatically removes managers
in one context but not another. Clearly defining which chapter applies to
a particular debtor would further diminish the likelihood of costly
manipulation .
The more important problem with the Act framework, however, was
simply that Chapter X took the drafters' concern for state involvement in
the bankruptcy process several steps too far. With the lessons of the Act
still relatively fresh, Congress almost certainly would avoid these mistakes
in crafting a more context specific Code, and might redress at least the
most obvious of the problems with an undifferentiated insolvency regime.
C. Pending Bankruptcy Legislation: The Proposed New Chapter 10 for

Small Businesses
Congress recently recognized the need for separate close and
nonclosely held corporation chapters, and considered new bankruptcy
legislation which initially proposed that a special chapter for small
business debtors be temporarily added to the Bankruptcy Code. 193 The
new chapter, Chapter 10, would have applied only to "small businesses,'"'

191.
!d. at 247.
See supra note 188.
192.
193.
S. 1985 , 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 205 (1992). The bill passed the Senate in
June, 1992. In October, 1992, the House pa ssed its own version of the legis lation. See
supra note 179. The House versio n omitted the proposed new chapter for small debtors
(and added various new prov isions), as did the reconciled version that ultimately stalled
in the House. The discussion in the text focuses on the proposed chapter for small
debtors, as set forth in§ 205(c) of the original Senate bill, and which is likely to reappear
in some form in future legis latio n. Hereinafter, provisions of the proposed new chapter ,
will be cited as uProposed Chapter 10 §
. " For a brief chronology of the legislative
process, see David F. Bantleon & Kathy L. Kresch , A Bankruptcy Law for the '90s, Bus.
L. TODAY , Jan.-Feb. 1993 , at 25.
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which th e leg islation defined as debtors '"whose aggregate liquidated
secured and unsecured debts as of the date of the petition do not exceed
$2,500,000." 194
The legislation appeared to contemplate that a
disinterested trustee rath er than a creditors' committee would represent
creditors' interests, since the United States Trustee would appoint a
trustee, but not necessarily a committee, in every case. 195 The drafters
intended to require that debtors file a plan within ninety days, thus
addressing the exclusivity problem, 196 and would have permitted small
businesses to violate absolute priority so long as the plan in question
"provides that all of the debtor's projected disposable income to be
received in the 3-year period ... will be applied to make payments under
the plan. " 197
The proposal in some respects addressed precisely the problems we
have identified with Chapter 11 's current network of undifferentiated
rules. In addition to the important step of recognizing the need for a
special close corporation chapter, the legislation would have shortened the
close corporation exclusivity period in exactly the fashion that I have
advocated. Unhappily, each of the other choices the drafters have made
for close corporations was questionable at best and potentially
counterproductive.
First, the legislation's definition of "small businesses" as debtors
whose liabilities do not exceed $2,500,000 raises several problems. As
the analysis above has shown, the definition should focus upon the
number (or more precisely, concentration) of shareholders, not simply on
the amount of liabilities, since shareholdership is a far more important
variable in distinguishing close from nonclosely held debtors. 198 A
better definition might have emphasized the number of shareholders and
the absence of public trading of the shares, as the ALI and some states do
outside of bankruptcy. 199 If the drafters did wish to retain a liability

194.
Propo sed Chapter 10 § 1001 (permitting "small business" debtors, as de fmed
in § 205 (a) o f the bill, to invoke the propo sed new chapter) . An earlier version o f the bill
would have left "small business" debtor la rgely unde fined, suggesting only that the co urt
should determine whethe r a debto r's use of propo sed Chapter 10 wo uld serve the best
interests of the estate. The dra fters' decision to revise the definition clearly was a good
one , g iven among other things the threat o f a reintroduction of the jurisdictional
maneuverings of the old Bankruptcy Act.
Proposed Chapter 10 § 1003 .
195.
196 .
Proposed Chapter 10 § 1021 .
197.
Proposed Chapter 10 § 1026(b) .
198 .
See supra notes 171-74 and accompanying text . Congress appea rs to have
mistakenly as sumed that the rea l distinctio n between types o f co rpo rations relates solely
to volume o f busines s. In actuality, vo lume of b usines s is onl y a pa rtially acc urate proxy
for the more impo rtant di fferences in shareho ldershi p and corpo rate governance stru cture.
See sup ra note 173.
199 .
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limitation on access to the chapter, however, they should have
significantly increased t.~e $2,500,000 ceiling, as many close corporation
debtors have liabilities far greater t~aJl this amount.
Second, the substitution of a trustee in place of a creditors'
committee might have improved on L1e current regime but would
probably have proved far less effective than the single creditor committee
that I have proposed. The problem with the trustee approach, aside from
the caseload burdens that already plague the U.S. Trustee system, is that
the governmental observer is at best an objective representative (and one
who, unlike a creditor, would have no familiarity with the debtor at the
start of the case). Unsecured creditors would be better off if someone
who has the same financial interest that they have represents them. 200
Finally, the drafters' proposal to require confirmation of plans that
dedicate all of the debtor's projected income for the following three years
to its current creditors would have given far too much flexibility to small
business debtors. While retention of a limited version of the new value
exception to absolute priority merits consideration in this context, as I
have suggested, 201 the new legislation goes well beyond this, affording
many debtors whose situation is in reality hopeless the ability to
reorganize so long as they promise to pay a hypothetical amount of future
income under the plan. The effect of the legislation in many cases would
be simply to postpone further the inevitable liquidation. As a result, the
drafters' decision to import Chapter 13's "fresh start" policy for
individuals into the very different context of corporate debtors would have
increased the cost of credit for all debtors, 202 since creditors would
charge higher interest rates to offset the unnecessary new costs created by
the new regime.
In short, in its existing version, the proposal to add Chapter 10 to the
Bankruptcy Code would have created at least as many problems as it
might have solved. But Congress's recognition of the need to distinguish
close corporations from nonclosely held firms offers at least a glimmer of
hope that the widespread conviction that Chapter 11 is not working will
lead to more promising changes in the current insolvency regime when
Congress tries its hand again in upcoming legislative sessions.

200.
Se e, e.g., Rock, s upra note 108, at 503 n .220 (similar probl em with
proposals to a ppo int a judicial co mmittee to decide whether sha reho lders' de rivative suits
sho uld be pursued).
2.01.
S ee s upra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
202.
Cf Bankruptcy Code § 1325(b) (co nfirmation provi sion n<2rl y identical to
Proposed Ch apter 10 § 1026(b)).
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CONCLUSION

Corporate bankruptcy reform in this country has in the last century
occurred at roughiy forty year intervals. Thus, Congress enacted new
corporate ballirJUptcy laws in 1867, 1898, 1938, and 1978. Recent
dissatisfaction with the current Bankruptcy Code is sufficiently acute ti-}at
a proposal to overhaul all aspects of the Code nearly passed Congress this
year, less than fifteen years since Congress's last effort at reform.
A growing number of commentators do not believe that simply
reforming the corporate reorganization provisions is enough and contend
that the time has come to replace Chapter 11 with an entirely different
insolvency framework. Unfortunately, none of the current proposals
adequately balances the desirability of more cost effective proceedings and
less judicial intervention in asset deployment decisions, on the one hand,
with the importance of judicial involvement for monitoring and discovery
purposes, on the ot}Jer.
This does not mean that Chapter i 1 should be retained in anything
like its current form, however. Given Chapter 11 's major shortcomings,
a context-specific, market-miented proposal that also provided a measure
of judicial oversight would warrant serious consideration. If, on the other
hand, Chapter 11 remains in place, it should be radically reformed. This
Article argues for the creation of separate chapters for close and
nonclosely held corporations, in order to begin the transition to a regime
with far more context specific rules.

